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AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ETHICAL
INTUITION IN LEGAL COMPLIANCE DECISIONMAKING FOR
BUSINESS ENTITIES
ERIC C. CHAFFEE *
I. INTRODUCTION
Amanda Appleton is a mid-level associate in the business law
department of Boxer & Boxer LLP, a large international law
firm. Her practice focuses on advising companies on matters relating to the regulation of publicly traded securities. She is well
respected at the firm, and her prognosis for making partner is excellent.
At 11:30 AM yesterday morning, Paul Pratt, a partner in the
business law department, called Appleton with an assignment.
Global Giant Corporation is preparing to make various public
disclosures by filing a Form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Pratt asked Appleton to research
whether some of the proposed disclosures might be considered
manipulative or deceptive in violation of various securities laws
and regulations. Pratt told Appleton to report back to him by
9:00 AM the following morning.
It’s now 4:38 AM, and Appleton sits staring out of the window
of her twenty-third floor office. She has reviewed the relevant
statutes, regulations, case law, and treatises, and she can find no
authority that the proposed statements will be viewed as manipulative or deceptive by a court or the SEC. Still, when she first
saw the proposed disclosures, she could not help feeling that the
disclosures are manipulative and deceptive. She is deeply conflicted about what to tell Pratt.
Situations similar to this hypothetical occur regularly in practice. Although the law is expansive, it is not comprehensive. Often, clarifying the
law comes at the risk of a client’s interests, and lawyers are called upon to
be odds makers in addition to competent researchers, communicators, and
advocates. In many circumstances, clients’ and colleagues’ hopes about
what the law might be are in direct conflict with a lawyer’s intuitions about
what the law likely is.
© 2015 Eric C. Chaffee.
*
Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., The Ohio State University. This Article benefited from discussions with
scholars too numerous to mention. I would like to offer special thanks to Professors Susan R.
Martyn, Agnieszka McPeak, and Rosalind Simson for providing feedback and advice that contributed greatly to this Article. I would also like to thank Christine Gall, Esq. for her encouragement
while drafting this work. The views set forth in this essay are completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer or client either past or present.

497

498

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:497

This Article explores what role a lawyer’s ethical intuitions should
play in making decisions about legal compliance matters in the business
world. Lawyers must choose between either helping clients minimally
comply with the law or providing them with some ethical counsel in addition to legal advice. This Article suggests that a lawyer’s ethical intuitions
can provide useful information in helping a client comply with its legal and
extra-legal duties.
In this Article, the term “ethical intuition” is used to designate the feeling that a specific action is good, evil, or morally neutral, i.e., the unconscious recognition of the moral qualities of an action without a resort to reason. The exact source and nature of ethical intuitions, however, remain
open for debate. Some would argue that ethical intuitions are emotional responses to particular situations. 1 Others would suggest that ethical intuitions are more similar to reflex responses to moral dilemmas. 2 Still others
would claim that ethical intuitions are conditioned responses based on previous experiences. 3 Perhaps all of these hypotheses are correct. The purpose of this Article, however, is not to take a position on the source of ethical intuitions, and because of the issue’s complexity, the true nature of
ethical intuitions will be left for another day.
Before progressing, the metes and bounds of the subject matter of this
Article should be defined. As a moral theory, ethical intuitionism is controversial because it suggests that morality is subjective and relativistic.
Critics of this Article are likely to fail to appreciate the nuanced and precise
manner in which ethical intuitions should be used in legal compliance matters relating to business entities.
To be clear, this Article is not an attempt to develop a moral theory or
normative system based on ethical intuitionism, but it is an explanation of
how lawyers can better help to protect business entities through the use of
ethical intuitions. One must remember the famous words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., in The Path of the Law in which he stated, “The law is full of
phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language contin-

1. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 19 (2003) (discussing the role of emotion in moral decisionmaking); Lawrence
M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2003)
(arguing that the impulse to blame, i.e., intuition, is “a combination of cognitive and emotional
responses to bad events”).
2. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the
Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1609 (2005) (noting “the increasingly more recognized assumption
that moral judgment derives from intuitive disgust reflexes rather than from a more calculated
process of ratiocination and moral reasoning”).
3. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 542–43
(1988) (stating that moral intuitions are based at least in part upon “shared cultural heritage of
what constitutes a good argument for a proposition”).
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ually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it,
as we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our
minds.” 4 He continued, “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”5 In recent
years, the legal academy has seen a proliferation of moral theories regarding
what the law ought to be. Although these moral theories are often interesting and sometimes useful, this Article aims at the use of ethical intuition to
determine what the law is in the Holmesian tradition. In advocating for the
use of ethical intuition in legal compliance matters, this Article provides a
mechanism for predicting how courts, legislatures, administrative agencies,
and the public might respond to a business’s actions. The issue of whether
ethical intuitions provide the foundations of morality will not be addressed.
This Article is also limited to advocating for the use of ethical intuitionism in legal compliance matters facing business entities. Ethical intuitionism is controversial in part because humans have widely varying intuitions on many social issues, including abortion, the use of military force,
and gun control. However, from securities regulation, to product labeling,
to truth in advertising, to dealing fairly with labor, most of the legal compliance issues facing businesses relate to the commission of some form of misrepresentations against the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or the public. 6 Even if the particular compliance issue does not directly
involve fraud or misrepresentations, such as illegal dumping of toxic waste
or bribery of government officials in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, misrepresentations and deceptions are usually somehow involved
because businesses almost invariably prefer to hide their bad behavior from
the public, government, and business partners. 7 Most people agree that de-

4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1897).
5. Id. at 461.
6. See Bernard W. Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, and Privacy, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 151, 154 (2002) (stating that “many white-collar
offenses involve deception . . . [but,] many traditional crimes involve use of force”) (footnote
omitted); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears—On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503, 519 n.57 (1994) (“There is no commonly accepted definition of white-collar crime, but most writers conclude that it includes bribery, embezzlement, fraud (other than welfare fraud), price-fixing, and insider trading—in general, nonviolent
economic crimes that include some degree of fraud, collusion, or deception, and that lack an element of face-to-face interpersonal force.”); John Hasnas, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ethical
Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel in the World of the Holder Memorandum, 44 VAL. U. L. REV.
1199, 1209 (2010) (“[W]hite collar crime almost always consists of crimes of deception.”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 591, 606 (2006) (noting that the conduct being examined for criminality in
white collar crime cases “is often based on ethical lapses, betrayals of trust, and deceptions”).
7. See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar
Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 406 (1993)
(“The white collar criminal’s goal is to conceal all evidence that a crime has been committed
while preserving the patina of legality surrounding the normal conduct of business.”).
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ception is wrong, 8 and intuition is one of the best mechanisms for determining deception and misrepresentations. 9 This Article focuses on the use of
intuition in this less controversial context and leaves discussions of the use
of intuition in other contexts for later articles.
In addition, this Article does not advocate for the subordination of established legal duties to ethical intuitions. In the event that a legal duty is
clear, a lawyer has an ethical obligation to help the client to comply with
that duty, regardless of that lawyer’s intuitions about what the law ought to
be. 10 This Article advocates for the use of ethical intuition only in circumstances in which the client’s legal obligations are less than certain. Use of
ethical intuition should be viewed as only part of the due diligence in determining how a client should behave to conform to the law. 11 Legal re-

8. See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1538 (2010) (“Generally speaking, when someone
commits a wrong—murder, rape, theft, or fraud, say—we share an intuitive sense that the wrongdoer should be punished.”); Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent,
and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 72
(2013) (noting that a “common moral intuition [exists] that deception is wrong and the law should
discourage it, or at the very least, not encourage it”); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution
in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2011)
(“[T]here appears to be an enormous amount of agreement about intuitions of justice across all
demographics, at least with regard to the core of wrongdoing—physical aggression, taking property without consent, and deceit in exchanges.”).
9. See Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical Promotion: Constitutionally Permissible Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading Commercial Speech?, 37 AM. J.L.
& MED. 278, 290–91 (2011) (noting that “[c]ourts often rely on their common sense and intuition
in determining whether deception has occurred” and providing various examples of this phenomenon); Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients With Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney
Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (2011) (“Ignoring moral intuitions about a
business client’s plan often means ignoring the basis for liability, such as a lack of good faith or
fraudulent intent.”).
10. Beyond the requirement that a lawyer comply with the law as a citizen of the jurisdiction
in which the lawyer resides, the rules of professional conduct in most, if not all, jurisdictions specifically require a lawyer to comply with the law in the course of representing clients. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.”); id. r. 8.4(b)–(c) (providing that a lawyer may not “commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects [or] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”). Lawyers
in most, if not all, jurisdictions are permitted to incorporate other considerations into their advice
to clients, including moral and social considerations, but no jurisdiction has rules of professional
conduct that permit violation of the law. See id. r. 2.1 (“In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
11. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound
Decisions with Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2006) (discussing the reasons
why protocol and custom should be considered in addition to intuition when attempting to make
sound decisions with limited knowledge).
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search and analytic reason must be at the heart of the calculus in determining what a client’s legal and extralegal duties are likely to be.
The remainder of this Article is structured in the following manner.
Part II discusses the recognition of the role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking in a variety of different academic disciplines, including
metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral economics. Part III and Part IV respectively discuss the importance of using
ethical intuition in legal compliance matters and the various concerns that
the use of ethical intuition creates. Part V explains how ethical intuition
can be employed by lawyers in counseling businesses in compliance matters. Finally, Part VI contains brief concluding remarks.
Ultimately, this Article advances existing scholarship in three main
ways. First, this Article highlights a growing acknowledgement by academics in various disciplines of the role of intuition in moral decisionmaking. Simply put, the recognition of the use of intuition in moral decisionmaking has broad interdisciplinary support from scholars and scientists in a
variety of academic fields. 12 The second purpose of this Article is to help
import the broad interdisciplinary recognition of the use of intuition in moral decisionmaking into legal scholarship. A small number of excellent law
review articles have been written discussing the use of intuition in moral
decisionmaking and its relationship to the law.13 These articles, however,
stop short of discussing the broad interdisciplinary movement that has developed regarding the use of intuition in moral decisionmaking and tend to
focus on one or two academic disciplines in addition to law. No existing
law review article juxtaposes the recognition by philosophers, scientists,
and social scientists that intuition plays a role in how individuals make
moral decisions. 14 The third purpose of this Article is to break new ground
by exploring the uses and applications of ethical intuitions in legal compliance matters facing business entities. 15
12. See infra Part II (discussing the growing recognition of the role of intuition in moral decisionmaking in various academic disciplines, e.g., philosophy, science, psychology, and economics).
13. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 11; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 1633 (2007); R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 1381 (2006).
14. Oliver R. Goodenough and Kristin Prehn have written a book chapter that discusses the
broad interdisciplinary recognition of the role of ethical intuition in moral reasoning and the importation of this recognition into the study of law and justice. Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin
Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, in LAW AND THE
BRAIN 77 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). This Article deepens the discussion
begun in that chapter, imports it into the legal journals, and applies it to legal compliance in the
business world.
15. The legal academy has already shown an interest in this issue. In 2007, Professor Milton
Regan published an article exploring the relationship between ethical intuitions and organizational
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II. THE RISE OF ETHICAL INTUITIONISM
The importance of intuition in moral decisionmaking has been recognized by numerous academic disciplines. This Article highlights that
recognition in the fields of philosophy, science, psychology, and economics
by specifically examining the recognition of the importance of intuition in
metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral economics. 16 In addition, the final subsection of this Part will explain that most
people employ ethical intuition when they resort to practical reasoning in
the context of everyday moral dilemmas. To be clear, however, this Part is
not designed to be an exhaustive literature review of the study of ethical intuition within academic circles, or even within the disciplines discussed. It
is only designed to provide an introduction to a variety of academic disciplines that have well-known scholars who acknowledge the role of intuition
in moral decisionmaking.
A. Metaethics
Although metaethics 17 arguably did not develop as a distinct academic
discipline until the beginning of the twentieth century, 18 philosophers and
culture. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 941 (2007). The article was so well-received that it was selected as the 2007 American Association of Law Schools annual meeting article. Id. Rather than focusing on legal compliance matters, however, the article focused on the role of ethical intuitions in how organizations function.
Id. Professor Regan’s article created the need for an article discussing how ethical intuitions
might be used by a lawyer to assist a business entity in complying with its legal and extra-legal
duties. This Article is designed to fulfill that need.
16. Metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral economics are
highlighted, because they show the broad appeal of ethical intuitionism. These disciplines appeal
to individuals with disparate views about what is to be most highly valued in academic study.
Metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral economics respectively represent fields that
emphasize the good, the real, and the efficient. Philosophers who study ethics usually place an
emphasis on what constitutes good, and they use the findings of scientists and economists to validate their theories about how good can be achieved. Scientists tend to put aside the theories of
philosophers and economists in favor of what can be proven about how the world really exists.
Finally, economists tend to use philosophy and science as a tool for understanding how society
can function most efficiently. In short, philosophers, scientists, and economists often have very
different views of the world. Moral psychology will be discussed, because that discipline offers
sophisticated models of how the mind functions. Moreover, psychology provides the bridge between cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics, because psychology studies the link between neural structures and behavior. In fact, two of the luminaries in the behavioral economics
movement, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, were trained as psychologists. Of course, the
importance of intuition in moral decisionmaking has been recognized in other academic fields as
well, for example, religious studies and political science.
17. Metaethics is a branch of the field of philosophy known as ethics. Metaethics traditionally entails moral semantics, moral epistemology, and moral metaphysics. See Terry Horgan &
Mark Timmons, Introduction, in METAETHICS AFTER MOORE 1, 1 (Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons eds., 2006) (“Whereas normative ethics is concerned to answer first-order moral questions
about what is good and bad, right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, metaethics is concerned to answer second-order non-moral questions, including (but not restricted to) questions about the se-
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religious scholars initially recognized the role of ethical intuition in moral
decision-making centuries ago. 19 For example, during the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas suggested that human beings know first moral principles through a form of ethical intuition that he referred to as “synderesis.” 20
According to Aquinas, synderesis allows individuals to know the first principles of natural law, which, according to him, is divine in its origins. 21
Human beings then use reason, which he calls “conscience,” to develop
secondary principles and to apply these principles to specific situations.22
Similarly, during the eighteenth century, David Hume wrote of the
central role in moral decisionmaking of what he called “sentiment.” He
used the term “sentiment” to describe intuitive emotion, which he contrasted with analytic reasoning. 23 As explained in A Treatise of Human Nature,
Hume believed that sentiment plays a key role in moral decisionmaking because moral judgments influence actions, and reason alone is insufficient to
inspire human beings to act. 24 Hume wrote, “Morality . . . is more properly
felt than judg’d of; tho’ this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and

mantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and discourse.”). Beyond metaethics,
the remainder of the field of ethics is comprised of normative ethics and applied ethics. Normative ethics focuses on the establishment of standards, guidelines, and norms regarding how people
ought to behave. See PETER A. ANGELES, THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 95
(2d ed. 1992) (defining the normative ethics as “moral philosophy that provides humanity with
general guidelines or knowledge about such things as (a) what is good and right (bad and wrong),
(b) what people ought to do (and ought not to do) in specific situations, (c) what should be pursued in life, (d) how life should be lived, and (e) what we should do to others and what they
should do to us”). Applied ethics involves the application of moral principles to particular situations and circumstances. The fields of metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics often overlap and blur.
18. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
19. The claim that ethical intuition plays a role in moral decisionmaking falls within the field
of metaethics. This claim has moral epistemological overtones, because it suggests that morality
is learned at least in part based on intuition. The claim also has moral metaphysical overtones,
because it suggests a source of morality and that morality exists based at least in part on the dialectic between the mind and the external world. See supra note 17 (explaining that metaethics
entails both moral epistemology and moral metaethics).
20. 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I, q. 79, art. 12 at 407 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1948) (“Wherefore the first practical
principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural
habit, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said to incite to good, and to murmur at
evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit.”).
21. Id.
22. See id. art. 13 at 407–08 (discussing the role of conscience in moral reasoning).
23. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 107–15 (Prometheus Books 2004) (1777) (discussing the role of sentiment in moral decisionmaking).
24. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 457 (2d ed. 1985) (1739–40) (“Since
morals . . . have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d
from reason . . . . Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular.”).
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gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea . . . .” 25 Under Hume’s
analysis, human beings use sentiment, i.e., emotion and intuition, to decide
how to act when confronted with a moral dilemma. 26
In addition to Hume’s sentimentalism, throughout the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, many other philosophers recognized
the role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking. For example, in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Henry More, 27 John Balguy, 28 Samuel
Clarke, 29 Ralph Cudworth, 30 and Richard Price 31 each advanced moral theories based at least in part on the idea that intuition plays a role in morality.
In the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick also advanced a moral theory involving ethical intuitionism, and he dedicated a substantial number of pages
in The Methods of Ethics and Outlines of the History of Ethics for English
Readers to discussing the different moral theories based on ethical intuitionism. 32
All of this set the stage for the popularization of ethical intuitionism by
British philosophers in the early twentieth century. In 1903, G.E. Moore
published Principia Ethica, which has been recognized as the beginning of
metaethics as a separate field of philosophy. 33 Although Moore was reluctant to be labeled an “intuitionist,” Moore has become one of the most influential proponents of the role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking,
based on the ideas that he expressed in Principia Ethica. 34 Moore argues
that “good” is an indefinable property because good is basic and has no
parts. 35 Moore claims that moral theorists commit what he refers to as a
25. Id. at 470.
26. Hume did acknowledge the close relationship between sentiment and reason relating to
moral judgments. In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume wrote, “[R]eason
and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.” HUME, supra note 23,
at 5.
27. See HENRY MORE, ENCHIRIDION ETHICUM (Edward Southwell trans., Literary Licensing,
LLC 2011) (1667).
28. See JOHN BALGUY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL GOODNESS (Nabu Press 2011) (1728).
29. See SAMUEL CLARKE, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS
OF NATURAL RELIGION (Gale ECCO, Print Editions 2010) (1738).
30. See RICHARD CUDWORTH, A TREATISE CONCERNING ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE
MORALITY (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1970) (1731).
31. See RICHARD PRICE, REVIEW OF THE CHIEF QUESTIONS AND DIFFICULTIES OF MORALS
(General Books, LLC 2009) (1757).
32. HENRY SIDGWICK THE METHODS OF ETHICS (Thoemmes Press ed., 1996) (1907);
HENRY SIDGWICK OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS (LONDON,
MACMILLAN & CO. 1886).
33. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993) (1903); Horgan &
Timmons, supra note 17, at 1 (“Metaethics, understood as a distinct branch of ethics, is often
traced to G. E. Moore’s 1903 classic Principia Ethica . . . .”).
34. See MOORE, supra note 33, at 35–36 (discussing Moore’s viewpoints on intuitionism).
35. See id. at 61 (“‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a
thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important
sense of the word . . . because it is simple and has no parts.”).
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“naturalistic fallacy,” when they attempt to define “good” in terms of the
natural properties of something that they believe to be good, because this
does not define good itself. 36 Moore argues that good is a property of
which human beings have an intuitive awareness, because “good” cannot
otherwise be proven. 37 In Moore’s view, “good” does not have a concrete
definition, and human intuition is required to know and understand what is
“good.” 38
Other early twentieth century scholars built upon Moore’s work. For
example, in 1912, H.A. Prichard published Does Moral Philosophy Rest on
a Mistake?. 39 Prichard argues that all normative systems of ethics are attempts to justify and explain preconceived feelings of obligation and intuitions about how one ought to act. 40 Prichard claims that moral philosophy
is simply an attempt to prove and rationalize preexisting intuitions about
what constitutes right and wrong. 41 Moore also influenced W.D. Ross, and
in his 1930 treatise The Right and the Good, Ross argued that basic ethical
truths are self-evident and form the foundation of prima facie ethical duties. 42 Ross provides a nonexclusive list of these duties, which include duties of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement,
and non-maleficence.43 Ross’s system of morality ultimately requires a
balancing of the duties created from these self-evident truths. 44
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the popularity of normative ethical theories based on intuitionism waned. 45 The focus of many
moral theorists shifted from ethical intuition to analytic reasoning. 46 Some
academics even began to use the term “intuitionism” in a pejorative manner. 47
Even during this period, however, moral theorists still recognized the
role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking. For example, in A Theory
of Justice, John Rawls discussed a state of being that he termed “reflective
equilibrium” in which ethical intuitions of justice are in balance with analytical principles of justice. 48 Reflective equilibrium is reached by a pro36. Id. at 61–62.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id.
39. H.A. Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, 21 MIND 21 (1912).
40. Id. at 21–22.
41. Id.
42. W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 39–41 (1930).
43. Id. at 21.
44. Id.
45. See Philip Stratton-Lake, Introduction to ETHICAL INTUITIONISM: RE-EVALUATIONS 1
(Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002) (noting that “during the 1950s and 1960s intuitionism was rejected out of hand as an utterly untenable theory”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42–43 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999).
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cess through which intuitions and analytic principles are adjusted through
self-reflection until a person’s set of beliefs is rendered coherent.49 Rawls’s
theory of reflective equilibrium is appealing, because it explains both the
role of ethical intuition and analytic thinking in moral decisionmaking.
In recent years, ethical intuitionism has experienced a reemergence.
Various scholars have advanced moral theories based at least in part on the
recognition that ethical intuition plays a role in moral decisionmaking. 50 A
partial explanation for the resurgence of ethical intuitionism as a moral theory is that science now validates that human beings make moral decisions
based at least in part on intuition.
B. Cognitive Neuroscience
Although the field of cognitive neuroscience 51 has roots that extend
back centuries, the term “cognitive neuroscience” is a relatively recent entry
into the scientific lexicon. The term was coined by Michael Gazzaniga and
George Miller in New York City during the late 1970s. 52 The rapid development of this field has occurred as a result of the invention of various neuroimaging technologies within the past half-century. 53

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND
INTRINSIC VALUE (2004); MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM (2005). See generally
Thomas Baldwin, The Three Phases on Intuitionism, in ETHICAL INTUITIONISM: REEVALUATIONS, supra note 45, at 92–112.
51. Cognitive neuroscience is the study of how the physical structures and functions of the
brain relate to the conscious and unconscious operations of the mind. See Michael S. Gazzaniga,
Karl W. Doron & Chadd M. Funk, Looking Toward the Future: Perspectives on Examining the
Architecture and Function of the Human Brain as a Complex System, in THE COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCES 1247, 1247 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 4th ed. 2009) (“The aim of cognitive
neuroscience is to advance our understanding of the organization and function of the human brain
and, ultimately, to solve the mystery of how the human brain creates the human mind.”). Scientists who work in the field seek to explain in physical terms how the mind operates and how the
process of human thought occurs. Id. The field can be viewed as a branch of both neuroscience
and psychology, or it can be described as a hybrid between the two because of its close relationship with both disciplines. See Brenda Milner, Larry R. Squire & Eric R. Kandel, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Study of Memory, 20 NEURON 445, 445 (1998) (“Cognitive neuroscience originated in two disciplines: in psychology, in the development of rigorous methods for analyzing
behavior and cognition, and in systems neurobiology, in the effort to understand the structure and
function of neuronal circuits of the sensory and motor systems of the brain.”).
52. Although the location of the event is debatable, Michael Gazzaniga and George Miller
are credited with coining the term “cognitive neuroscience” during the 1970s. Compare John T.
Bruer, Mapping Cognitive Neuroscience: Two-Dimensional Perspectives on Twenty Years of
Cognitive Neuroscience Research, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 51, at 1221
(“Michael Gazzaniga and George A. Miller coined the name cognitive neuroscience in 1976, over
martinis at the Rockefeller University Faculty Club.”), with Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 14,
at 84 (reporting that the term “cognitive neuroscience” was “coined, the story goes, during a New
York taxi ride in the late 1970s”).
53. See Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 14, at 84 (“Although cognitive neuroscience was
well launched before the advent of such imaging technologies as PET and fMRI, the availability
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Prior to the development of sophisticated neuroimaging technologies
beginning in the late 1950s, scientists had to rely almost exclusively on lesion studies to conduct research on the subject matter that currently falls
within the field of moral cognitive neuroscience.54 The term “lesion” designates abnormal tissue that in most cases has been created by disease or
trauma. 55 Lesion studies are studies of this abnormal tissue. These studies
have many shortcomings. In the absence of brain scan technology, lesion
studies in many cases can be conducted only postmortem, and lesion studies
reveal information regarding brain structure, while leaving uncertainty as to
brain activity. 56
Perhaps, the most famous lesion study in the field of moral cognitive
neuroscience 57 is the case of Phineas P. Gage. 58 In the summer of 1848,
Gage worked as a construction foreman for the Rutland & Burlington Railroad and was in charge of a group of men who were in the process of laying
down track for the Railroad’s expansion into Vermont. 59 In the process of
clearing stone for the track, Gage accidently detonated explosive powder
that he had inserted into a hole in a rock. 60 The force of the explosion drove
an iron rod that Gage had been using to pack the explosive through his left
cheek, through the front of his brain, and through the top of his skull. 61
Remarkably, Gage lived and recovered physically with the exception of losof non-intrusive methods that allow us to establish functional connections between mental tasks
and specific anatomical structures has increased its power and accelerated its application.”).
54. See Elissa M. Aminoff et al., The Landscape of Cognitive Neuroscience: Challenges,
Rewards, and New Perspectives, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 51, at 1255–56
(“Historically, the ability to draw conclusions regarding the necessity of a brain structure to perform a particular cognitive operation has been limited to lesion studies in animals and the rare occurrence of focal lesions in humans due to brain insults or surgery. In recent years, new methodological techniques such as transcranial magnetic simulation (TMS) have enabled the noninvasive
manipulation of cortical activity in healthy individuals.”).
55. See Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 14, at 84.
56. Id.
57. This Article exclusively focuses on moral cognitive neuroscience, which is the study of
how the physical structures and functions of the brain relate to the conscious and unconscious
moral operations of the mind. In some regards, metaethics can be viewed as a form of moral cognitive neuroscience because metaethics focuses on understanding how the moral mind functions.
Moral cognitive neuroscience is distinct from metaethics, however, because moral cognitive neuroscience focuses on the physical structures and functions of the brain whereas metaethics focuses
on the functioning of the mind itself and usually does not emphasize how the brain is physically
structured and operates.
58. See generally ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (Penguin Books 2005) (1994) (providing an in-depth examination of Phineas
Gage’s accident and his importance to the field of moral cognitive neuroscience); MALCOLM
MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF PHINEAS GAGE (2000) (providing a detailed
discussion of Phineas Gage’s life and his historical significance).
59. DAMASIO, supra note 58, at 3–4 (describing the circumstances surrounding Gage’s accident).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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ing vision in his left eye. 62 Though his memory, intelligence, and linguistic
abilities were unaffected, 63 the damage to the prefrontal cortices of his
brain, however, negatively impacted his moral character and diminished his
ability to make good moral choices.64
Gage’s story is significant to the field of moral cognitive neuroscience
because it validates that certain regions and systems in the brain play a significant role in moral decisionmaking. At the time of Gage’s injury, the
concept that different areas of the brain might be responsible for different
mental functions was not a new one. For example, in the late 1700s, Franz
Josef Gall developed and championed phrenology, a pseudoscience that
suggested that different parts of the brain have different roles in mental activity. 65 Gage’s story helped to prove that different structures in the brain
play a role in moral reasoning. This revelation validates the underlying
premise of moral cognitive neuroscience that the physical structures and
functions of the brain relate to the conscious and unconscious moral operations of the mind.
The story of Phineas Gage and the stories of other individuals with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage also help validate the importance of
intuition and emotion in moral decisionmaking. In the 1990s, Antonio
Damasio undertook extensive study of Gage’s case and patients with similar ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage. 66 In his book Descartes’ Error:
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Damasio links the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex to the systems in the brain that form the basis for emotional processing. 67 He concludes that emotion and feeling are “indispensable
for rationality” and moral decisionmaking. 68 Importantly, Damasio does
not undercut the role of rationality and analytic thought; he argues only that
emotion and feeling have a role to play in rational behavior. 69 Other scien-

62. Id. at 8 (“Gage regained his strength and . . . his physical recovery was complete. Gage
could touch, hear, and see, and was not paralyzed of limb or tongue. He had lost vision in his left
eye, but his vision was perfect in the right.”).
63. Id. at 11 (noting that after Gage’s accident that he displayed “apparent intactness” of his
“attention, perception, memory, language, [and] intelligence”).
64. Id. at 8 (noting that after the accident “Gage was no longer Gage” because of his inability
to make good moral decisions).
65. See FRANZ JOSEF GALL, ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN AND OF EACH OF ITS PARTS:
ON THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL QUALITIES AND INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF MAN, AND THE
CONDITIONS OF THEIR MANIFESTATION (Winslow Lewis trans., Boston, Marsh, Capen & Lyon
1835).
66. DAMASIO, supra note 58.
67. Id. at 61 (“If the ventromedial sector [of the brain] is included in the lesion, bilateral
damage to prefrontal cortices is consistently associated with impairments of reasoning/decision
making and emotion/feeling.”).
68. Id. at xvi–xvii.
69. Id.
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tists have reached similar conclusions about the role of the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and emotion in rational decisionmaking. 70
In addition to lesion studies, the development of neuroimaging technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have allowed for significant advances in the field of moral cognitive neuroscience.
When fMRI is employed, magnetic fields and radio waves are used to
monitor blood flow in the brain that is associated with neural activity. 71
The fMRI process produces images that show which portions of the brain
are active at the time when the imaging occurs. 72 Thus, fMRI technology
makes it possible to link activities in the brain to operations of the mind. 73
Jorge Moll and his colleagues have conducted a number of studies using fMRI technology to investigate brain activity in moral decisionmaking. 74 Based on these studies and after reviewing the work of others, Moll
and his colleagues have identified many of the areas of the brain that are
commonly involved in moral cognition. 75 After juxtaposing his research
with research regarding the structures of the brain commonly associated
with emotion, Moll and his colleagues have recently written that “[m]oral
emotions play a central role in both implicit and explicit moral appraisals,
being an essential ingredient for human social cognition.”76 Put another

70. See Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel & Antonio R.
Damasio, Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1034 (1999) (observing that in individuals with prefrontal cortex damage “emotional responses to social situations and behavior in situations that require knowledge of complex social conventions and moral rules were inadequate”); Hanna
Damasio, Thomas Grabowski, Randall Frank, Albert M. Galaburda & Antonio R. Damasio, The
Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from the Skull of a Famous Patient, 264 SCI.
1102, 1102 (1994) (describing the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and emotion in rational decisionmaking).
71. See Aminoff et al., supra note 54, at 1255–58 (discussing the use of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) as a tool for exploration in the field of cognitive neuroscience).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See Jorge Moll, Paul J. Eslinger & Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Frontopolar and Anterior
Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in
Normal Subjects, 59 ARQUIVOS DE NEURO-PSIQUIATRIA 657 (2001); Jorge Moll, Ricardo de
Oliveira-Souza, Ivanei E. Bramati & Jordan Grafman, Functional Networks in Emotional Moral
and Nonmoral Social Judgments, 16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002); Jorge Moll, Ricardo de OliveiraSouza, Paul J. Eslinger, Ivanei E. Bramati, Janaina Mourao-Miranda, Pedro Angelo Andreiuolo &
Luiz Pessoa, The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2730 (2002).
75. See Jorge Moll, Roland Zahn, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Frank Krueger & Jordan
Grafman, The Neural Basis of Human Moral Cognition, 6 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 799,
800 (2005). But see id. (noting some “differential findings” regarding the possible activation of
additional areas of the brain in the process of moral cognition).
76. See Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Roland Zahn & Jordan Grafman, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Emotions, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
ed., 2008).
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way, Moll and his colleagues have determined that moral reasoning contains at least some non-analytic, intuitive components.77
The recognition that emotion and intuition play a role in moral decisionmaking is in some regard unremarkable because individuals prone to
antisocial and immoral behavior are commonly defined by their emotional
deficiencies. For example, psychopaths and others with anti-social personality disorders are diagnosed by their emotional deficits, such as lack of
empathy and lack of remorse. 78 The groundbreaking contribution of Damasio, Moll, their respective colleagues, and others working in the field of
moral cognitive neuroscience is locating the areas of the brain that are associated with moral decisionmaking and demonstrating that many of those areas are responsible for emotional processing as well. Notably, moral cognitive neuroscience research has also demonstrated that psychopaths and
others individuals with antisocial personality disorders tend to show dysfunction in the areas of the brain that are commonly associated with emotional moral decisionmaking. 79
To be clear, although emotion and intuition play a role in fueling moral decisionmaking, analytic reason has a role to play also. Professor Joshua
Greene and his colleagues have conducted various studies employing fMRI
technology to track emotional engagement in moral decisionmaking. Initially, these studies suggested that the role of emotion and intuition tends to

77. See also Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment
Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002) (synthesizing a variety of findings relating to moral
cognitive neuroscience that suggest a major role for emotion and affective intuition in moral reasoning).
78. See Robert D. Hare & Craig S. Neumann, Psychopathy as a Clinical and Empirical Construct, 4 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 217, 219–21 (2008) (providing a commonly used checklist for determining psychopathy that includes various affective factors, such as lack of remorse,
shallow affect, callousness, and lack of empathy).
79. See, e.g., Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107, 120–22 (2006) (reviewing
and synthesizing cognitive neuroscience research on affective processes in psychopathy); Kent A.
Kiehl, Andra M. Smith, Robert D. Hare, Adrianna Mendrek, Bruce B. Forster, Johann Brink &
Peter F. Liddle, Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677, 682
(2001) (reporting on the results of a study “support[ing] the hypothesis that criminal psychopathy
is associated with abnormalities in the function of structures in the limbic system and frontal cortex while engaged in processing of affective stimuli”); Jurgen L. Muller, Monika Sommer, Katrin
Dohnel, Tatjana Weber, Tobias Schmidt-Wilcke & Goran Hajak, Disturbed Prefrontal and Temporal Brain Function During Emotion and Cognition Interaction in Criminal Psychopathy, 26
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 143 (2008) (reporting on the results of an fMRI study that “support the
notion that emotion–cognition interaction is disturbed in psychopaths”); Adrian Raine & Yaling
Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGNITIVE &
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203, 210 (2006) (concluding that “the rule-breaking, immoral behavior of antisocial and psychopathic individuals may in part be due to impairments in those brain
regions subserving moral cognition and emotion; [and] while impairments to the moral emotional
system may be primary in antisocials, disruption of moral cognitive and cognitive-emotional systems are also possible”).
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be greater in circumstances in which “personal” moral dilemmas are being
addressed. 80 For purposes of this research, “personal” moral dilemmas
were defined as situations “(i) likely to cause serious bodily harm, (ii) to a
particular person, (iii) in such a way that the harm does not result from the
deflection of an existing threat onto a different party.” 81 An “impersonal”
moral dilemma was defined as a dilemma that fails to meet the criteria for a
personal moral dilemma. 82 Professor Greene and his colleagues posed various moral dilemmas to participants in the studies and used fMRI technology
to monitor brain activity in response to these moral dilemmas. 83 The studies demonstrated systematic variations in the use of emotion in moral decisionmaking based on whether the moral dilemma posed was personal or
impersonal. 84 Based upon methodological concerns regarding this research,
which Greene and his colleagues acknowledged and embraced,85 Greene
and his colleagues have conducted additional research and have refined
their theories. 86 They now believe that the role of emotion and intuition in
moral decisionmaking tends to vary based on whether an individual is making deontological moral judgments, which are moral decisions about rights
and duties, or consequentialist moral judgments, which are moral decisions
about the “greater good,” and they believe that emotion and intuition is
more closely linked to deontological moral judgments. 87 Notable, none of

80. See Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley & Jonathan D. Cohen, An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293
SCIENCE 2105 (2001).
81. See Greene & Haidt, supra note 77, at 518–19 (summarizing earlier research by Joshua
Greene and his colleagues investigating the role of emotion in moral decisionmaking involving
“personal” and “impersonal” dilemmas).
82. Id.
83. See Greene et al., supra note 80, at 2106–07 (explaining the experiments conducted by
Greene and his colleagues).
84. Id. at 2107.
85. Compare Jonathan McGuire, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart & Catriona Mackenzie, A
Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Research, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 577 (2009) (criticizing the methodology used in the research
conducted by Greene and his colleagues), with Joshua D. Greene, Dual-Process Morality and the
Personal/Impersonal Distinction: A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 581 (2009) (embracing and responding to that criticism).
86. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom &
Jonathan D. Cohen, Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 107
COGNITION 1144 (2008).
87. See Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra
note 76, at 35–36 (“[D]eontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and . . .
deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent an
exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which . . . arises from
rather different psychological processes, ones that are more ‘cognitive,’ and more likely to involve
genuine moral reasoning.”); Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene, Moral Reasoning: Hints and
Allegations, 2 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 511, 513 (2010) (“According to Greene, deontological
moral judgments, judgments that are naturally regarded as reflecting concerns for rights and duties, are driven primarily by intuitive emotional responses. At the same time, Greene et al. argue
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this research suggests that emotion and intuition or analytic reasoning yield
correct answers to moral dilemmas. This research does evidence that emotion and intuition have a role to play in moral decisionmaking.
C. Moral Psychology and Behavioral Economics
The recognition of the role of intuition in moral decisionmaking has
led to the development of sophisticated models as to how moral decisionmaking actually occurs. As previously discussed, a number of philosophers have created moral systems with intuition as a foundation.88 The early twentieth century British ethical intuitionists, for example, Moore,
Prichard, and Ross, represent the strongest use of intuition as a foundation
for a moral system. 89 Each of these individuals believed that intuition based
upon the dialectic between the mind and the external world is the foundation of morality itself.90
Other philosophers, such as John Rawls, have taken a more moderate
approach that allows a place for both analytic and intuitive processes in
moral reasoning. As previously explained, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls
discusses a state of being that he termed “reflective equilibrium” in which
ethical intuitions of justice are in balance with analytical principles of justice. 91 Rawls states that his theory of justice is “a theory of moral sentiments . . . setting out the principles governing our moral powers, or, more
specifically, our sense of justice.” 92 He continues, “[t]here is a definite if
limited class of facts against which conjectured principles can be checked,
namely, our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.” 93 Put simply,
Rawls proposes a dual-process moral theory in which both intuition and analytic reasoning play a role.
Unlike Rawls and the other philosophers discussed in this Article,
those who study moral psychology and behavioral economics are more
concerned about how moral decisionmaking occurs, rather than whether a
particular decision is right or wrong. Remarkably, however, scholars in
both fields have also developed dual-process theories of how moral decisionmaking occurs.
In the field of moral psychology, a debate has long raged over whether
analytic reason or emotion and intuition fuel moral decisionmaking. Sig-

that utilitarian/consequentialist judgments, judgments aimed at promoting the greater good, are
supported by controlled cognitive processes that look more like moral reasoning.”).
88. See supra Part II.A (discussing the use of ethical intuitionism as the basis for a variety of
moral theories).
89. See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text.
91. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 42.
92. Id. at 44.
93. Id.
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mund Freud, for instance, argued that what he termed the “super-ego” governs moral behavior through the moral sense of guilt. In Civilization and Its
Discontents, Freud wrote:
The super-ego is an agency . . . , and conscience is a function
which we ascribe . . . to that agency. This function consists in
keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and
judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the
harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity
of the conscience.94
Similarly, in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Freud
wrote, “The super-ego applies the strictest moral standard to the helpless
ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality,
and we realize all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of
the tension between the ego and the super-ego.” 95 Thus, Freud believed
that moral decisionmaking occurs at least in part based on the moral sense
of guilt.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Lawrence Kohlberg advanced a
theory of moral cognitive development based upon reasoning and reflection. Building upon earlier work by Jean Piaget, 96 Kohlberg argues that
moral development occurs in a series of six stages.97 In the first stage,
which Kohlberg refers to as “The Punishment and Obedience Orientation,”
a child assumes that the physical consequences determine the rightness or
wrongness of an action. 98 In the second stage, “The Instrumental Relativist
Orientation,” notions of reciprocity, sharing, and fairness begin to emerge
as the child begins to believe that rightness consists of satisfying one’s own
needs and occasionally the needs of others to obtain some personal benefit. 99 Next, in stage three, “The Interpersonal Concordance or ‘Good BoyNice Girl’ Orientation,” the child equates good behavior with what pleases
others or help them. 100 In Kolhberg’s fourth stage, the “Society Maintaining Orientation,” the child equates rightness with adherence to authority,
doing one’s duty, and maintaining social order.101 In the fifth stage, “The
94. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930), reprinted in 21 The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 136 (James Strachey
ed. & trans., 1964).
95. SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1930), reprinted in 22 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 61
(James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
96. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain
trans., Free Press 1965) (1932).
97. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 17–19 (1981)
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Id.
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Social Contract Orientation,” the rightness is determined by one’s obligation to society and preservation of individual rights.102 During this stage,
Kohlberg states, “[t]he result is an emphasis on the ‘legal point of view,’
but with an emphasis on the possibility of changing law in terms of rational
consideration of social utility.” 103 In the sixth and final stage, “The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation,” right comes to be defined by self-chosen
moral principles “appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and
consistency.” 104 As evidenced by the six stages, Kohlberg’s view of moral
cognitive development is a theory based upon analytic reasoning slowly
displacing hedonistic intuitions. 105
Kohlberg, however, is not without his critics. Carol Gilligan, for example, faults Kohlberg’s research and theory for being androcentric. 106 Gilligan is particularly troubled by the lack of female participants in the empirical study that gave birth to Kohlberg’s theory of moral cognitive
development. 107 Gilligan offers an additional theory of moral cognitive development that focuses on the moral development of women. 108 The ultimate result of this theory of development is a moral system based on emotion, which Gilligan terms an “ethic of care.” 109 Gilligan writes, “As we
have listened for centuries to the voices of men and the theories of development that their experience informs, so we have come more recently to notice not only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what they
say when they speak.” 110 She continues, “Yet in the different voice of
women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship and responsibility, and the origins of aggression in failure of connection.”111 Gilligan’s research and writing suggests that intuition and emotion may also
have a role in moral development. 112

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 18–19.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 17–19.
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 18 (1982)
107. Id. at 18 (reporting that “in the research from which Kohlberg derives his theory, females
simply do not exist. Kohlberg’s . . . six stages that describe the development of moral judgment
from childhood to adulthood are based empirically on a study of eighty-four boys whose development Kohlberg [had] followed for a period of over twenty years.”).
108. Id. at 173.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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More recently, Jonathan Haidt has also criticized rationalist models in
moral psychology. 113 In the place of these rationalist models, Haidt offers a
social intuitionist model.114 As Haidt describes it, “[t]he central claim of
the social intuitionist model is that moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral
reasoning.” 115 Haidt provides a variety of reasons to doubt primacy of analytic reasoning in moral decisionmaking. First, Haidt argues that intuition
is “ubiquitous” in the moral decisionmaking process, rather than the process
being fueled by analytic reasoning. 116 Second, Haidt claims that “the reasoning process is more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or scientist seeking [the] truth” 117 because individuals regularly seek to validate
their moral intuitions with post hoc reasoning. 118 Third, Haidt argues that
post hoc reasoning often creates the illusion of objective reasoning, when
intuition is the real basis for moral decisionmaking. 119 Fourth, Haidt argues
that moral action correlates more with moral emotion, rather than with moral reasoning. 120 In Haidt’s view, “moral reasoning is rarely the direct cause
of moral judgment.” 121 Thus, in Haidt’s social intuitionist model, emotion
and intuition are the driving force behind moral decisionmaking. 122
Some scholars have tried to find a middle ground between rationalist
theories and intuitionist theories of moral decisionmaking. Joshua Greene,
for example, has used his moral cognitive neuroscience research to develop
a dual-process theory of moral decisionmaking. 123 In describing this theory, Greene suggests “both intuitive emotional responses and more controlled cognitive responses play crucial and, in some cases, mutually competitive roles” in moral judgment. 124 He links intuition and analytic
reasoning to different categories of moral decisionmaking. Greene writes,
113. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (“This article reviews evidence against
rationalist models and proposes an alternative: the social intuitionist model.”).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 817.
116. Id. at 819 (noting that evidence exists that “moral judgment works like other kinds of
judgment, in which most of the action is in the intuitive process”).
117. Id. at 820.
118. Id. at 822 (“Under . . . realistic circumstances, moral reasoning is not left free to search
for truth but is likely to be hired out like a lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of preordained conclusions.”).
119. Id. at 823 (arguing that “[p]eople have quick and automatic moral intuitions, and when
called on to justify these intuitions they generate post hoc justifications out of a priori moral theories”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 815.
122. Id. at 830.
123. Joshua D. Greene, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment, in THE COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 51, at 987, 991.
124. Id.
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“this theory associates controlled cognitive processing with utilitarian (or
consequentialist) moral judgment aimed at promoting the ‘greater
good.’” 125 He continues, “this theory associates intuitive emotional processing with deontological judgment aimed at respecting rights, duties, and
obligations.” 126 This model is similar to dual-process models of moral decisionmaking that have been proposed in the past. Remarkably, however,
science is now validating these dual-process theories of moral judgment
through recently developed brain scan technology.
A similar sort of debate over the role of intuition in decisionmaking
has also raged in the field of economics. Notably, prior to writing The
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith, who is viewed by some as the father of
modern economics, authored The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 127 In that
work, Smith argues that all individuals are endowed with moral sentiments, 128 and that moral sentiments play a leading role in making moral
judgments. 129 When an individual is guided by that person’s “passions,”
the individual’s actions are judged by others’ moral sentiments.130 He
writes,
When the original passions of the person principally concerned
are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing
the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with
what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them. 131
Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism is somewhat unsurprising because he
was a member of the Scottish Enlightenment and was contemporaries with
and likely influenced by David Hume who, as previously mentioned, championed a theory of moral sentimentalism. 132
Of course, Smith portrayed humans as being more rational and calculating in his later treatise, The Wealth of Nations. 133 In that work, he wrote,
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Liberty Classics 1976) (1759).
128. Id. at 47 (“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles
in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to
him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.”).
129. Id. at 58.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing Hume’s theory of Moral Sentimentalism).
133. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937) (1776).
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we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”134 This
conception of humans as rational, self-interested, utility-maximizers has
been termed by some to be “homo economicus” or the “economic human.”
Although this narrow view of human nature may be a useful simplification
for purposes of developing economic theory, it fails to entail the full range
of human decisionmaking. 135 Remarkably, this conception of human nature
has dominated much of modern economics from the days of Adam Smith to
the present. 136
In recent years, however, with the rise of behavioral economics, economists have begun to focus more on how individuals actually make decisions, rather than assuming consistent utility-maximizing rationality. For
example, Daniel Kahneman has proposed a dual-process approach for understanding human decisionmaking. In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Professor
Kahneman argues that two systems are responsible for decisionmaking. 137
The first system is based upon intuitive thought, which he writes, “is more
influential than your experience tells you, and it is the secret author of many
of the choices and judgments you make.” 138 The second system is based
upon deliberate thought. 139 As Professor Kahneman describes it, intuitive
system can be described as “fast” thinking and the deliberate system can be
described as “slow” thinking. 140 Together, these two systems tell the story
of how humans actually make decisions.141
What ultimately can be learned from the debates in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and economics that are discussed above is that intuition has a role to play in moral decisionmaking. This Article does not assert
that intuition yields ethically correct solutions to moral problems. Simply,

134. Id. at 14.
135. See John Stuart Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy; and On the Method of
Philosophical Investigation in that Science, 26 LONDON & WESTMINSTER REV. 1, 12 (London,
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer 1836) (“What is now commonly understood by the term ‘Political Economy’ is not the science of speculative politics, but a branch of that science. It does not
treat of the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man
in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is
capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.”).
136. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that the
purpose of economics is “to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer
of his ends in life”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1060
(2000) (noting that the conception of human beings as rational, self-interested, utility-maximizers
pervades modern economics because “[r]ational choice theory is the heart of modern microeconomic theory”).
137. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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all this Article suggests is that intuition is employed in reaching conclusions
when confronted with moral questions.
D. Resort to Practical Reason
An additional ground for believing that intuition is a part of the moral
decisionmaking process is that it reflects how most people actually make
moral decisions. The majority of people resort to intuition, which also
could be termed “practical reason,” when confronted with ethical dilemmas. 142 In everyday life, when confronted with moral issues, few people
spend time thinking about the following questions: What would Immanuel
Kant do, if faced with a similar situation? Or, what would John Stuart Mill
do? Most people simply opt for what intuitively seems like the best solution.
Some individuals do try to conform themselves to certain moral systems. Even with that being the case, intuition still plays a role. For example, although most individuals when faced with an ethical quandary do not
ask themselves what Kant or Mill would do, many Christians ask the following question when faced with a difficulty ethical decision: What would
Jesus do? During the 1990s, evangelical Christians even popularized this
question as a means for determining how to behave. 143 With that said, even
if one chooses to conform one’s behavior to Christian orthodoxy, intuition
still has a role to play. For instance, the Ten Commandments play a fundamental role in both Christianity and Judaism. One of the Commandments
provides: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”144 The
question of what constitutes “false witness” or a misrepresentation is often
one that is determined by intuition. Although certain misrepresentations
can be easily discerned, especially those that can be judged quantifiably, de142. See John Darley, Realism on Change in Moral Intuitions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1643, 1653
(2010) (“The folk theory that people hold about punishment is a naturalistic one, in the sense that
people intuitively feel that the core prohibitions against physical harms, unauthorized takings, and
deception in exchanges have a moral rightness that stems from forces that exist beyond the mere
agreements of interacting individuals.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (“[S]ocial
science evidence suggests that judgments about justice, especially for violations that might be
called the core of criminal wrongdoing, are more the product of intuition than reasoning.”).
143. See also Bill Broadway, Fashion Testament; For Christian Teens, ‘WWJD’ Bracelet Is
an Attention-Getting Badge of Faith, WASH. POST, July 12, 1997, at B7 (reporting that “[f]rom
beaches to mountains, coast to coast, Christian teenagers are in hot pursuit of bracelets marked
with the letters ‘WWJD.’”); Mike Burke, Little Reminders of Faith: Teens Can’t Get Enough of
WWJD Paraphernalia, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 1, 1998, at Neighbor 1 (reporting that the letters “WWJD” “can be seen on everything from T-shirts and caps to bumper stickers and stationery”); Emily Nussbaum, Status is . . . for Evangelical Teen-Agers; Jewelry for Jesus, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/15/magazine/status-is-for-evangelical-teenagers-jewelry-for-jesus.html (reporting on the wearing of “WWJD” bracelets among evangelical
Christian teenagers during the late 1990s).
144. Exodus 20:16 (King James).
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termining whether many assertions are misrepresentations can be incredibly
difficult, and often can be discovered only by resorting to intuition.145 In
short, even in rigid moral systems, intuition still often comes into play.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHICAL INTUITIONISM IN LEGAL COMPLIANCE
Up to this point, a great deal has been said about the role of intuition in
moral decisionmaking, and very little has been said about the importance of
moral intuition in legal compliance for business entities. In this Part, the
role of moral intuition in providing insights into the foundations of law, assisting in the discovery of the law, and protecting business entities will be
discussed.
A. Moral Intuition Provides Insights into the Foundations of Law
Although not a substitute for legal research, moral intuition can be
used to gain insight into the foundations of law. This is because laws are
institutionalized norms in a democratic society that are created to some extent based on the moral intuitions of the populace. Moreover, legislators
and judges use moral intuitions in their own decisionmaking processes in
creating law.
At least in part, laws in a democratic society are built upon moral intuitions regarding what should be legally punishable. As previously discussed, when faced with moral problems, the vast majority of individuals
resort to some extent to moral intuition to resolve those problems. 146 When
public outcry occurs regarding some form of behavior in a democratic society, legislatures and other regulators often respond to that outcry by passing
laws and regulations. 147 This outcry is often based at least in part upon the
practical reason, i.e., the collective intuition, of the public.148 In addition,
145. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the proposition that intuition is one
of the best mechanisms for determining deception).
146. See supra Part II.D (suggesting that most people resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition,
when faced with moral issues).
147. See Frederick K. Beutel, An Outline of the Nature and Methods of Experimental Jurisprudence, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 432 (1951) (“Often [laws] are the product of impassioned
emotions rather than systematic study. . . . As a result of this haphazard practice, most current
laws are carried along by the force of inertia until they either become obsolete or are repealed due
to . . . public clamor . . . .”); Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
269, 271 (2009) (“The view that legal systems are a product of instinct is consistent with a growing recognition among scholars that innate predispositions play a crucial role in shaping many aspects of human behavior.”).
148. See Singer, supra note 3, at 542 (“Law is based, to some substantial extent, on our intuitive judgments of right and wrong, fairness and unfairness, justice and tyranny.”). Notably, the
pressure that the public places upon politicians to pass laws and regulations is not always rational.
See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes)
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 630 (“[T]here is a burgeoning literature describing how the availability heuristic results in a skewed assessment among the public as
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because most individuals resort to some extent to their moral intuitions to
define what is acceptable behavior, laws must at least in some regard conform to those intuitions. This is because to be legitimate in a democratic
society, laws must to some extent conform to collective intuitions of justice. 149
Moreover, the public is not alone in their use of moral intuition to create law because legislators and judges use moral intuitions in their own decisionmaking processes to create law. Of the two categories, legislators and
judges, the assertion that legislators use moral intuition to some extent in
their creation of law is likely less controversial because legislators are not
required to have legal training prior to undertaking their duties in creating
and fine-tuning the law.
With that said, intuition is often a gap-filler when analytic reasoning
fails a judge. For example, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 150 the Supreme Court of
the United States overturned the conviction of Nico Jacobellis, a manager
of a motion picture theater, for two counts of possessing and exhibiting an
obscene film in violation of Ohio law. 151 The case centered on the issue of
whether a French film called Les Amants (“The Lovers”), was obscene, and
therefore, not entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 152 In overturning the conviction, the majority of the Court produced four opinions,
including concurrences, and the opinion of the Court was written by Justice
William Brennan with only Justice Arthur Goldberg joining. 153 The most
famous language from the case, however, comes from the concurrence of
Justice Potter Stewart. 154 In declaring that First Amendment protections are
severely limited in regard to “hard-core pornography,” Justice Stewart
wrote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.” 155 He continued, “But I know
it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” 156
As evidenced by Justice Stewart’s statement, intuition has a role to play in
the analytic framework of the law in certain circumstances.
to the relative likelihood of various calamities, and therefore misplaced pressure on elected representatives to enact laws that will redress virtually nonexistent harms.”).
149. See John M. Darley, Citizens’ Assignments of Punishments for Moral Transgressions: A
Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 101, 106, 112 (2010) (arguing that “a society that has in place a criminal justice code that is persistently deviant from the
shared moral intuitions of the community risks losing the unforced obedience of its members to its
laws”).
150. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
151. Id. at 185–87.
152. Id. at 186–87.
153. Id. at 185.
154. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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In terms of legal compliance for business entities, moral intuition has a
special role to play because many of the legal compliance issues facing
businesses relate to the commission of some form of misrepresentation
against the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or the public.
For example, during the 1930s, Congress promulgated the Securities Act of
1933 157 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 158 as a means of preventing fraud, deceit, and other misrepresentations in the purchase and sale of
securities. 159 As Justice Arthur Goldberg accurately described it while writing for the majority in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 160 “A
fundamental purpose, common to [the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” 161 Put simply, one of the fundamental
purposes of both the Securities Act and Exchange Act is preventing misrepresentations to the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, and
the public. In fact, from securities regulation to product labeling to truth in
advertising to dealing fairly with labor, most legal compliance issues facing
legal entities relate to the commission of some form of misrepresentation
against the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or the public. 162 Although in certain situations the line between truth and misrepresentation is clear, it is not in many instances. As a result, judges, lawyers,
business people, and members of the public have to simply rely on a “know
it when I see it” approach, similar to Justice Stewart in Jacobellis, 163 in determining when the line between puffery and misrepresentation worthy of
sanction has been crossed.

157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
158. Id. §§ 78a–78nn.
159. See Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
843, 851–52 (2009) (discussing the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of
1934 as a means to prevent fraud, deceit, and other misrepresentations in the purchase and sale of
securities and suggesting that the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and arguing these Acts
were needed to supplement a state law system that was “largely ineffective in preventing fraud”);
see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of a Security, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
1135, 1138–40 (2006) (discussing the advent of federal securities law in the United States in the
shadow of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression).
160. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
161. Id. at 186.
162. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (noting that most legal compliance issues for
business entities relate to the prevention of some form of fraud or misrepresentation).
163. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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B. Moral Intuition Assists in Discovering the Law
Because laws are to some extent the institutionalized collective moral
intuitions of society, moral intuition can assist in discovering the law. Moral intuition can suggest the need for additional legal research, limit information gathering costs, and help to answer difficult legal questions.
When attempting to discern the law, moral intuition can be a powerful
tool for discovering the law. In the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article, for example, the attorney’s intuitions about whether proposed disclosures might be considered manipulative or deceptive in violation of securities law suggested the need to dig deeper in terms of her research.164 The
attorney has reason to trust her intuition because intuitions of justice tend be
shared across our society. As reported in a recent article, Professors Paul
Robinson and John Darley write, “Social science research demonstrates that
people’s intuitions of justice are quite nuanced and that, for the punishment
of serious wrongdoing, our intuitions are widely shared across societies and
demographics.” 165 In a follow-up article, Professors Paul Robinson, Robert
Kurzban, and Owen Jones argue, “[A]cross demographics, even across cultures, humans share nuanced intuitions (1) about what constitutes serious
wrongdoing, (2) that serious wrongdoing should be punished, and (3) about
the relative blameworthiness of offenders.”166 In terms of legal compliance
for business entities, individual intuition about the fairness of a particular
action can be useful in determining when follow-up legal research is required because individual intuition can give insight into the institutionalized
moral intuitions of society that are memorialized in laws and regulations.
Although moral intuitions can vary from person to person, those seeking to
discover the law can employ their intuitions as a means of determining
when they need to dig deeper in terms of their research.
In addition to suggesting when additional research is necessary, moral
intuition can also reduce information gathering costs. Attorneys representing business entities are often forced to make legal compliance decisions
with limited time, with limited financial resources, and based upon incomplete information about how the decision might impact the future of the
business entities that they represent. This can be especially true when a
business entity is entering into a transaction because time may be of the essence in closing the deal. Attorneys representing business entities must be
careful to avoid “paralysis by analysis,” and this often means that legal advice must be given in a world of limited time, limited resources, and limited
information. Moral intuition can help to limit information gathering costs
because it can help to give guidance when paucities of time, resources, and

164. See supra Part I.
165. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 142, at 3–4.
166. Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 13, at 1639.
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information exist. As previously mentioned, moral intuition can give insight into the law and suggest the need for further research. As a result,
such intuition can give guidance when a deal needs to be slowed down to be
considered more fully. It can also give insight as to whether a deal may
have a long-term negative impact on the company based upon how the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, and the public might perceive it. Of course, thorough and exhaustive research is the ideal when it
comes to providing legal advice. In many instances, however, based on the
fast pace of the business world, moral intuition may be a necessary evil
when time, resources, and information are scarce.
Moral intuition is also useful to help answer difficult legal questions to
which traditional legal research may have no answer. First, moral intuition
can help to fill in gaps in the law that courts and other regulators have not
yet filled. As illustrated by the hypothetical at the start of this Article and
as discussed in the introduction, although the law is expansive, it is not
comprehensive. 167 Because the law is based at least in part upon institutionalized moral intuitions, where legal research reaches its outer limits, intuition can provide insights about how a court may fill in the gaps in the
law. This is not to claim that law and morality are coexistent; this is only to
claim that moral intuition may provide some insight as to how courts and
other regulators might react. Second, moral intuition also helps to provide
insight into what a jury might do in the event that circumstances lead to litigation. Although judges work hard to instruct juries on how to go about
applying the facts to law, research demonstrates that almost invariably juries make decisions of guilt and liability without regard for jury instructions. 168 Because most people resort to their moral intuitions at least in part
when assigning blame, intuition can be a powerful tool in answering how a
jury might respond to a particular action by a business entity.
C. Moral Intuition Helps to Protect Business Entities
Moral intuition is especially useful in helping to protect business entities from legal and social sanctions. Although the role of legal research and
analytic reasoning should not be underplayed, moral intuition assists business entities in determining their legal obligations, assists businesses to
avoid traps set for those entities attempting minimum compliance, and helps

167. See supra Part I.
168. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in
Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1538–39
(2012) (“The standard story told about juries and the law is that the legal instructions jurors receive at the end of the trial are little more than window dressing—either the jurors simply ignore
the instructions or they are hopelessly confused by the legal guidance the instructions purport to
give. . . . An alternative view of jury instructions is that the legal system is ambivalent or even
opposed to interfering with juries as they apply their laypersons’ sense of justice.”)
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to shield businesses from extra-legal punishment for socially reprehensible
behavior.
As previously discussed, business managers and lawyers representing
business entities are often forced to make decisions with limited time, with
limited financial resources, and based upon incomplete information.169 Intuition can be a valuable resource in determining how to comply with the
law in those situations involving one or more of those limitations. Intuition
can suggest the need for additional legal research, limit information gathering costs, and help to answer difficult legal questions. Intuition is not superior to exhaustive legal research and exhaustive legal reasoning. Intuition,
however, is often a necessary evil for coping with paucities of time, financial resources, and information.
Intuition also helps business managers and lawyers avoid the traps set
for those attempting minimum compliance with the law. As previously discussed, much of the wrongdoing in the business world is based upon misrepresentations to the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or
the public. 170 Because of the breadth of the federal mail fraud statute171 and
the federal wire fraud statute,172 many misrepresentations can quickly be
transformed into federal cases involving substantial criminal sanctions.
Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 173 the federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are also predi-

169. See supra Part III.B (arguing that intuition assists in discovering the law in situations in
which time, resources, and information are scarce).
170. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (arguing that most legal compliance issues
involve some sort of misrepresentation to other parties and that intuition offers a tool for determining when a misrepresentation may occur and preventing it).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or
spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both.”).
172. Id. § 1343 (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both.”).
173. Id. §§ 1961–1968.
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cate crimes, 174 and as a consequence, they can create increased criminal liability, if a pattern of racketeering activity can be established.175 Moreover,
RICO also creates a private cause of action for civil recovery with treble
damages and attorney’s fees. 176 As a result, because a definitive test for
what constitutes a misrepresentation can be difficult to articulate and no
bright line rule for what constitutes a misrepresentation exists, intuition can
help discern when a misrepresentation may be occurring and thereby help to
prevent substantial civil and criminal liability. 177
Similarly, intuition can also be useful in discerning the contours of the
fiduciary duties of care and good faith owed by officers, directors, and other
managers within business entities. Within a business entity, the duty of
care is procedural in nature and requires officers, directors, and other business managers to reasonably inform themselves of matters germane to the
operation of the business entity. 178 As with all reasonableness standards,
what constitutes “reasonableness” remains uncertain until a court determines the issue after litigation occurs. Obviously, officers, directors, or
other business managers should thoroughly inform themselves regarding
the operations of the business entities that they serve. Intuition can give
some assurance to those managers and the lawyers advising them that they
have adequately informed themselves or that they should be digging deeper.
Intuition may be even more useful in determining the obligations entailed by the duty of good faith. At its heart, the duty of good faith is the
duty of officers, directors, and other business managers not to act reprehensibly in their operation of and service to business entities. 179 Although
breaches of the duty are often coupled with breaches of other fiduciary duties, for example, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, the duty of good
faith also may render unlawful certain behavior that may not violate the
other traditional fiduciary duties.180 Because “good faith” is an inherently
174. Id. § 1961(1) (providing a definition of the types of “racketeering activity” that constitute
predicate crimes for a RICO violation).
175. Id. § 1962 (detailing the types of activity that are rendered unlawful under the RICO statute).
176. Id. § 1964(c).
177. See supra note 9 (providing various sources for the proposition that intuition is one of the
best mechanisms for determining fraud).
178. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (providing one of the leading
opinions on the duty of care and holding that directors have a duty of care that requires them to
consider all information “reasonably” available to them).
179. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 564 (2008) (“Good faith is not a new concept in corporate law. It has been called an ‘immutable ingredient’ of the business judgment rule, for example, setting forth the law’s expectation that directors will take honest and prudent business risks in
the best interests of the company and its shareholders.”); see generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006).
180. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2005) (“Many corporate law decisions discuss good faith,
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ambiguous term that raises questions of morality, intuition provides one
means of prospectively discerning the requirements of good faith prior to its
obligations being defined by a court in litigation.
Moreover, intuition can also be useful in determining business entities’
responsibilities in terms of the transactions that they enter. For example, in
contract law, the doctrine of unconscionability and the duty of good faith
are concepts used to punish business entities for opportunistic behavior that
may not be easily definable using analytic reason and legal research. Although courts have made numerous efforts to define “unconscionability,”
the metes and bounds of the doctrine remain less than clear. 181 In terms of
the spectrum of circumstances that might constitute unconscionability,
some circumstances are clearly legally permissible or unconscionable, but a
great many circumstances are far from certain. 182 Intuition can help to provide some insight as to which contracts will be held unconscionable when
legal research and analytic reasoning reaches its outer limits. Likewise, the
duty of good faith is often used in contract law to punish behavior that is
reprehensible that cannot be clearly defined. 183 As a result, intuition can be

but a significant trend has emerged in a handful of recent decisions that not only discuss a fiduciary duty of good faith but also rely upon it as the basis of the decision. These cases suggest that
good faith is more than just a new spin on old dicta.” (footnote omitted)); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006) (holding that an “intentional dereliction
of duty,” which is “a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” is not covered by traditional
definitions of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty). But see Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (recasting the duty of loyalty and holding that “[i]t
also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith”).
181. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined
by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.” (footnote omitted)); Waters
v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Mass. 1992) (holding that “[u]nconscionability must be determined on a case-by-case basis, with particular attention to whether the challenged provision could
result in oppression and unfair surprise”).
182. See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of PostEmployment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 391–92 (2002)
(noting that because the definition of substantive unconscionability “is ambiguous, the ‘unconscionability’ of a particular term or contract is highly subjective” (footnote omitted)); Paul Bennett
Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
187, 187 (2006) (“Determinations about unconscionability are subjective. To date no one has
been able to articulate an objective standard.”); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability:
The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in
Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 484 (2008) (“Decisions based on unconscionability are fact sensitive and, to a great extent, reflect trial judges’ subjective determinations.
As a result, although there are now many cases that address unconscionability, they have little
value as precedents.” (footnote omitted)).
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
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a key tool in determining the enforceability of contracts that may be vital to
a business organization’s existence. 184
Intuition can be especially useful in shielding business entities from
the extra-legal punishments for socially reprehensible behavior. Even if the
law is absolutely clear as to the permissibility of a certain action by a business entity, that action still may not be in the best interests of the business
entity because of the extra-legal sanctions that the behavior may yield. Because most individuals resort to intuition and practical reason in making
moral decisions, intuition may be a resource when determining what extralegal punishments may be incurred for a legally permissible action that violates moral or social standards. 185 Intuition can help to inform business
counsel and business managers that failing to perform on a legally unenforceable contract may engender scorn from future contracting partners and
hurt a business’s prospects in the future. In addition, intuition can also help
to inform a business’s managers and counsel that questionable employment
and environmental practices may create backlash from potential consumers
of that business’s products.
To provide a more concrete example, during the 1970s, the Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) manufactured and sold a subcompact automobile
known as the “Pinto.” 186 Due to a design flaw, the gas tank of the car could
be easily punctured and lead to an explosion during a collision.187 Rather
than fix the design flaw, Ford’s management did a cost-benefit analysis and
determined that it would be cheaper to pay tort settlements, instead of paying the $11 per vehicle cost to repair the problem. 188 Mother Jones, a nonprofit magazine, eventually broke the story regarding the design defect and
the cost-benefit analysis employed by Ford to determine the how to fix the
issue. 189 As a result, a public fiasco ensued, and Ford suffered substantial
long-term damage to its reputation and substantial tarnishment of its trademarks. 190 Even if Ford had correctly calculated the cost-benefit analysis,

184. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369–70 (1980) (“Yet neither courts nor commentators have articulated an operational standard that distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith performance [in contract law]. The good faith performance doctrine consequently appears as a license
for the exercise of judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable and inconsistent applications.” (footnotes omitted)).
185. See supra Part II.D (suggesting that most individuals resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, when faced with moral issues).
186. See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 1977),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (reporting that “Ford waited eight years because its internal ‘cost-benefit analysis,’
which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn’t profitable to make the changes sooner.”).
190. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013,
1013–14 (1991) (reporting that Ford Motor Company’s behavior regarding the Pinto is “still being
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which it likely did not, the company suffered severe extra-legal punishment
based on public perception of its management’s behavior.191 Although
Ford’s management may have acted rationally in attempting to minimally
comply with the law and in determining what legal punishments might befall it based upon the design defect in the Pinto, some reliance upon and
deference to intuition as to how the public might react to the callousness of
management’s behavior potentially would have quickly, easily, and cheaply
prevented the extra-legal punishments suffered by Ford in that case.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF ETHICAL INTUITIONISM IN LEGAL
COMPLIANCE
Some judges, lawyers, and academics will find the notion to be unsettling that intuition has a role to play in discerning and determining the law.
This is because such an assertion beckons forth thoughts of the fierce debate in the United States that has waged among proponents of legal formalism and proponents of legal realism throughout the twentieth century to the
present. As will be explained below, the applicability of the formalism versus realism debate to the subject matter of this Article is limited. However,
a brief exploration of this topic should be undertaken.
To grossly oversimplify the debate, legal formalists believe that judges
decide cases based on legal rules and analytic reasoning, 192 but legal realists
believe that judges decide cases founded upon notions of fairness and politics in relation to the facts of the particular case.193 In a sense, the debate
between legal formalists and legal realists mirrors the eternal debate over
whether the letter of the law or the spirit of the law should and does dominate.
Although the debate between legal realism and legal formalism might
appear to have great applicability to this work, this Article has intentionally
not ventured into the debate between legal realism and legal formalism for
three main reasons. First, most legal realists believe that matters are adjudicated based on notions of fairness, depending on the particular facts of a
case. 194 With that said, however, arguing that those notions of fairness are
founded upon intuition requires taking an additional step that some legal rementioned with a surprising frequency and discussed with a surprising intensity” (footnote omitted)).
191. Id.
192. See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson
eds., 2005) (“‘Formalism’ . . . held that judges decide cases on the basis of distinctively legal rules
and reasons, which justify a unique result in most cases (perhaps every case).”).
193. Id. (“The Realists argued . . . that careful empirical consideration of how courts really
decide cases reveals that they decide not primarily because of law, but based (roughly speaking)
on their sense of what would be ‘fair’ on the facts of the case.”).
194. Id.
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alists would not be willing to take. Second, legal realism centers on adjudication of cases. 195 This Article is about protecting business entities from a
myriad of issues relating to compliance with the law, which often do not involve adjudication, for example, selection for prosecution, nuisance litigation, increased governmental scrutiny, increased regulation, and extra-legal
punishments. Forcing this Article into the cast of a piece on legal realism
would be a disservice because the topic of this work entails much more than
mere adjudication. Third, legal formalism and legal realism involve strong
claims about how adjudication occurs, and those terms carry a substantial
amount of baggage because of the endless debate about which theory is correct. Arguably, legal formalism could be viewed as a defense of legal research and analytic reasoning in judicial decisionmaking, and legal realism
could be viewed as a defense of notions of fairness, including possibly intuitions of justice, in judicial decisionmaking. Similar to the dual-process
models for moral decisionmaking that were discussed earlier in this
work, 196 however, this Article argues that both analytic reasoning and intuitive reasoning have a role to play in making legal compliance decisions for
business entities. The dual-process model offered here gives prominence to
analytic reasoning and legal research and uses intuition as a gap-filler when
reasoning and research fails or is exhausted. In fact, this Article proposes
something that is related to but separate and apart from the realism versus
formalism debate.
Regardless of the realism versus formalism debate, the use of intuition
in making legal compliance decisions raises a variety of other concerns.
The remainder of this Part will address many of those concerns: that intuition is not necessarily a theory of how to reach correct moral decisions, that
intuition can yield incorrect conclusions about the state of the law, and that
moral intuition can vary. Even though each of these concerns has some validity, the use of intuition when correctly employed in making legal compliance decisions, on balance, has more benefits than harms. 197
A. Intuition Is Not Necessarily an Ethical Theory of How to Make
Correct Moral Decisions
This Article is definitely not a defense of moral intuition as a theory as
to how individuals should or do make correct moral decisions. As detailed
earlier in this work, philosophers throughout the ages have advanced ethical
theories based upon moral intuitionism, and such theories continue to be
195. Id. at 51.
196. See supra Parts II.A–C (describing several models of dual-process decisionmaking that
entail processes for both intuition and analytic reasoning, including those advanced by John
Rawls, Joshua Greene, and Daniel Kahneman).
197. See infra Part V (discussing methods by which intuition can be incorporated into the process of making legal compliance decisions).
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advanced today. 198 This Article, however, makes no claim that intuition
yields correct moral judgments. The assertion being made by this Article is
only that intuition often plays a role when individuals make moral decisions, i.e., decisions about right and wrong. Whether intuition actually is
the foundation of morality is an issue better left for another day. Relatedly,
arguments that attack this Article on the grounds that it is advocating for
ethical intuitionism as a moral theory are misplaced and ignore the realities
of what is being asserted within this work, which is only that intuition has a
role to play in making legal compliance decisions.
Although some individuals may be relieved by the fact that this Article
is not a defense of intuitionism as a theory of how to make correct moral
judgments, others may be disturbed. Because this Article does not propose
a moral theory based upon ethical intuitionism, some may fault its contents
because it fails to provide guidance as to what the law ought to be; creates
the potential for abuse based on behavior designed to manipulate or deceive
others’ intuitions; and may create quagmires in which law, morality and intuition conflict.
Some might fault this Article for failing to provide guidance as to what
the law ought to be. Such an argument, however, misses the point of this
Article. This Article is designed to assist legal practitioners in finding the
law when legal research and analytic reasoning is at an end, or when paucities of time, information, and resources demand it. It is also designed to
help legal academics better prepare their students for the realities of the
practice of law. At heart, this work focuses on determining what the law is,
rather than conjuring what the law ought to be. Confusion about the purpose of this Article is understandable because so much of current legal
scholarship focuses on theories of how the law ought to function. This Article serves a different purpose, however, describing the role that intuition
can and should play in finding what the law is.
In addition, because this Article does not assert that the use of intuition
yields correct moral judgments, another potential criticism of this piece is
that its content will help to train lawyers to manipulate the intuitions of
those seeking to regulate business entities and those in transactions with
such entities. This criticism actually has some merit. Famously, Daniel
Kahneman, who is discussed earlier in this Article, along with his frequent
co-author, Amos Tversky, spent much of their careers cataloguing the mental shortcuts that people commonly use to reduce cognitive workload, which
Kahneman and Tversky term “heuristics.” 199 Although these heuristics of-

198. See supra Part II.A (detailing the development of ethical intuitionism as a distinct ethical
theory and as a philosophic movement).
199. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (arguing that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic
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ten prove to be useful tool in most individuals’ decisionmaking processes,
Kahneman and Tversky noted that heuristics can lead to severe and habitual
errors in judgment. 200
Notably, Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences for his research in heuristics and human decisionmaking, and Tversky would have shared this prize but for his passing in
1996. 201 In keeping with Kahneman’s and Tversky’s research, if intuition
does not always yield correct moral decisions and if heuristics and other
sorts of intuitions can be catalogued and understood, someone could use
that information to manipulate the intuitions of those seeking to regulate
business entities and those in transactions with such business entities.
Concerns about the manipulation of intuitions are of course valid considering the role that intuition plays in filling gaps in the law and the role
that intuition serves in understanding how a judge, a jury, a prosecutor, a
regulator, a legislature, or members of the general public might react to certain behavior by a business entity.
These types of concerns, however, are nothing new and have been
written about since the time of Plato, if not earlier. In Plato’s writings of
Socrates found in the Gorgias, Plato reveals Socrates’ concerns regarding
the unprincipled use of oratory because morality is not inherent to oratory. 202 After determining “oratory is a source of persuasion,”203 Socrates
goes on to call oratory a “knack” and “flattery.” 204 As Socrates puts it,
“what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice.” 205 The reason for this is that
“[i]f you make someone an orator, it’s necessary for him to know what’s
just and what’s unjust, either beforehand, or by learning it . . . afterward.” 206
In essence, Socrates is arguing that knowledge of oratory must be coupled
with knowledge of what is just and unjust, or oratory can be used as a tool
for manipulation and achieving bad ends.

principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations”).
200. Id. (reporting that “heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systemic errors”).
201. See Daniel Kahneman, Princeton Univ., Nobel Prize Lecture: Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice (Dec. 8, 2002), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf (discussing
the research that led to Kahneman being awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
in 2002).
202. Plato, Gorgias, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 791 (John M. Cooper ed., Donald J. Zeyl
trans., Hackett Publishing Company 1997) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
203. Id. at 798.
204. Id. at 807.
205. Id. at 809.
206. Id. at 804.
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A similar sort of argument can be made about knowledge of how intuition functions. This knowledge potentially gives the power to persuade
without giving knowledge of what is just and unjust. As a result, the potential for abuse is beyond peradventure.
A variety of responses can be offered to this concern. First, understanding how intuition functions is not advocating for misuse of that
knowledge in a similar way that understanding how oratory functions is not
advocating misuse of it. A lawyer is bound by the rules of professional responsibility despite the fact that the lawyer may have knowledge and skills
that could be abused. 207 Second, understanding that intuition can be deceived in how the law is formulated and how the actions of business entities
are perceived can help lawyers better protect their clients. If a lawyer understands that intuition and oratory can be abused, that lawyer can better
protect the lawyer’s clients from less scrupulous attorneys who might engage in intentional deception and also reckless, negligent, or innocent deceptions of intuition.
In addition, because this Article acknowledges that intuition may not
necessarily provide a means for making correct moral decisions, some may
criticize its contents because it may create quagmires in which law, morality, and intuition conflict. For example, morality may suggest one result, yet
the intuitions of the public may suggest another. For example, at one point
in the history of the United States, as a result of ingrained prejudice, many
white individuals would likely have some intuitions favoring segregation.
Yet, today, almost uniform agreement exists that segregation is morally
wrong. Worse yet, situations may occur in which morality and intuition
suggest a result, and the law mandates another outcome. Moreover, in the
worst case scenario, intuition, morality, and the law may all three suggest
different outcomes to a given issue. In essence, accepting that intuition has
a role to play in making legal compliance decisions for business entities
may actually complicate the life of a lawyer because it adds an additional
variable into the decisionmaking process.
This Article takes the strong stance that when a business entity’s obligations are clear under the law that an attorney has an unwavering obligation to help their client comply with those obligations regardless of what
morality and intuition might suggest. Although the rules of professional
conduct in most, if not all, jurisdictions require an attorney to behave ethically, those rules make it clear that an attorney’s primary obligation is to

207. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c)–(d) (2013) (providing that lawyers may
not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [or] engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that lawyers under the rules of professional responsibility that are in place in
most, if not all, jurisdictions have an explicit obligation to follow the law).
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comply with the edicts of the law. 208 Any good professional responsibility
professor can create a myriad of examples in which intuition, morality, and
the law might conflict. In some circumstances, civil disobedience may be
warranted. However, this Article begins with the presumption that exhaustive legal research should be at the heart of any legal compliance decision,
and that intuition should be used only to suggest what the outcome might be
when legal research is exhausted; to help cope with deficits in time, information, and resources; and to suggest what sorts of extra-legal sanctions
might occur based upon a given decision. Once the primacy of legal research has been asserted, the claim becomes ludicrous that the extra information provided by intuition should be ignored based on it complicating the
decisionmaking process. Ignoring the information provided by intuition
would be similarly bizarre as an attorney ignoring electronic legal research
databases, such as, Lexis and Westlaw, because they provide too many new
sources of information that might complicate the attorney’s life. Intuition
should simply be treated as another tool at a lawyer’s disposal for purposes
of effectively advising clients.
B. Intuition Can Yield Incorrect Conclusions About the State of the
Law
As discussed in the previous subpart, concerns that intuition does not
necessarily provide an ethical theory for making correct moral decisions can
be overcome. However, a number of the points mentioned in the previous
subpart give rise to a second category of concerns regarding the use of intuition in making legal compliance decisions. This second category relates
to the worry that intuition can yield incorrect conclusions about the state of
the law. As discussed in the previous subsection, for example, research
conducted by Kahneman and Tversky suggests that some of the heuristics,
i.e., the mental shortcuts that people commonly use to reduce cognitive
workload, which can be equated to a type of intuition, can lead to severe
and habitual errors in judgment. 209 In addition, one of the examples offered
in the previous subpart suggested that some individuals may have intuitively felt that segregation was acceptable in the United States at various points
in this nation’s history, even though nearly universal agreement currently
exists that segregation is wrong. 210 Such errors in intuition obviously also
extend to the law. Even well-trained law professors, attorneys, and judges

208. See supra notes 10, 207 and accompanying text (discussing a lawyer’s obligations under
the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted in most jurisdictions in the
United States and which are similar to the rules in most, if not all, of the remaining jurisdictions).
209. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (discussing Kahneman’s and Tversky’s
research on heuristics and the cognitive errors that heuristics can yield).
210. See supra Part IV.A (discussing situations in which morality and intuition may be in conflict).
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are sometimes surprised when they discover that the law is different from
what they intuitively thought it to be.
The concern that intuition can yield incorrect conclusions about the
state of the law is a valid one. At times, a lawyer’s intuitions about the law
may be blatantly wrong and at times, individuals’ intuitions can be deceived. In addition, not all intuitions about fairness have been incorporated
into the law. In the remainder of this subpart, these concerns will be addressed. Ultimately, despite the validity of the concerns about intuition
sometimes yielding incorrect conclusions about the law, on balance, intuition remains a useful tool in making legal compliance decisions for business
entities, especially when intuition is correctly incorporated into the decisionmaking process. 211
This Article freely and unequivocally admits that intuitions relating to
the law can be blatantly wrong. With that said, intuition remains a valuable
tool in making legal compliance decisions for business entities for a variety
of reasons. First, the model proposed within this Article emphasizes the
primacy of legal research. As a result, even if intuitions about the state of
the law relating to compliance decisions are erroneous, extensive and exhaustive legal research will in many cases remedy this problem. Second, in
cases in which extensive and exhaustive legal research does not yield a
clear answer as to the state of the law, intuition may still be valuable as a
tool for determining the state of the law and the repercussions of a legal
compliance decision. As explained at length in this Article, most people
base decisions about right and wrong at least in part upon intuition, 212 and it
makes sense to consider intuition when legal research does not yield a clear
answer. For example, in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article,
intuition may offer the best course to proceed because the state of the law is
unclear, and because some aspects of the law, such as the existence of a
misrepresentation, often must be determined in part by a resort to intuition. 213 This is true regardless of whether intuition is sometimes incorrect.
Third, intuition is likely the best tool available considering what extra-legal
punishments might occur as a result of legal compliance decisions. Legal
research is a tool for finding the law but offers little insight as to what extralegal repercussions might occur based on a legal compliance decision, e.g.,
public outrage, the unwillingness of previous allies to enter into future
transactions, and the inability to obtain credit. Because so many people resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, in making decisions relating to extra-

211. See infra Part V (discussing how to incorporate intuition into the process of making legal
compliance decisions).
212. See supra Part II.D (noting that most individuals resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition,
when faced with a moral problem).
213. See supra note 9 (providing various sources for the proposition that intuition is one of the
best mechanisms for determining fraud).
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legal punishments, intuition is one of the more useful tools in predicting
what sorts of extra-legal punishments a legal compliance decision might
yield. This is true regardless of whether intuition is sometimes wrong.
Fourth, the practice of law occurs in the real world, rather than in the classroom, and as a result, those making legal compliance decisions often must
deal with deficits of time, information, and resources. As a result, intuition
at times may be a necessary evil in dealing with the realities of practicing
law. Fifth, analytic reasoning and legal research frequently yields inconclusive and incorrect results in determining legal compliance issues, and no
one would claim that they should be ignored as tools for finding the law,
even though they are imperfect. Similarly, intuition may at times yield incorrect results about legal compliance decisions, but that is no reason to
dismiss it from the decisionmaking process completely.
A related concern about the use of intuition in making legal compliance decisions is that intuition can be deceived. In the previous subpart,
concerns were discussed relating to the uncoupling of knowledge of intuition from a method for making morally correct decisions. 214 In essence,
one reason to be weary of the knowledge of how intuition functions is because an unscrupulous attorney or business person could use that
knowledge to manipulate other individuals by manipulating their intuitions. 215 In this subpart, however, a slightly different concern is advanced,
which changes the focus from the deceiver to the deceived. The notion underlying the current concern is that intuition can be subject to deception to a
degree and to an extent that legal research and analytic reasoning cannot.
One might argue that relying strictly on legal research and analytic reasoning would prevent the possibility of intuition being intentionally, recklessly,
negligently, or accidently deceived.
Concerns regarding intuition being deceived are valid, but these concerns do not justify ignoring intuition as a tool in making legal compliance
decisions. Deception in regard to legal research is obviously a rarity.
Computer hackers do not commonly hack electronic databases to mislead
those conducting legal research, and attorneys do not commonly break into
opposing counsels’ offices to rewrite research memoranda with erroneous
statements about the law. With that said, analytic reasoning is by no means
immune from deception and from the chance of grievous error. In fact, the
research conducted by Kahneman and Tversky on heuristics relates largely
to intuitive leaps that are commonly made and that are commonly incorrect
in the analytic reasoning processes of most individuals. 216 Moreover, the

214. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the concerns relating to the use of intuition not necessarily yielding morally correct judgments).
215. See supra Part IV.A.
216. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (discussing Kahneman’s and Tversky’s
research on heuristics).
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factual development of many legal issues commonly involves deception, as
parties disagree over the underlying facts of matters and intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or accidently misrepresent the facts creating legal problems. No one would suggest that fact development should be ignored as
part of assessing a legal matter, and intuition should not be ignored either
simply because it may fall victim to deception.
Even if intuition may at times be deceived, it cannot be ignored as a
tool for making legal compliance decisions because, as explained above, intuition is inherent to the creation of the law. In addition, intuition often determines the types of legal and extra-legal punishments that befall business
entities when those entities behave in ways that disappoint society’s collective intuitions of justice. The fact that intuition may yield incorrect results
and may be deceived is an unfortunate reality. However, intuition remains
an integral part of how legal and extra-legal punishments are distributed.
In fact, for an attorney charged with protecting a business entity, understanding how intuition can be deceived is essential to protecting a client’s interests. Attorneys can help prevent the decisionmakers of a business
entities from having their intuitions misled. Attorneys can also be vigilant
in making sure that the intuitions are not misled by those who might regulate or sanction the business entities that they represent.
An additional reason why intuition can yield incorrect conclusions
about the law is that not all intuitions about fairness have been incorporated
into the law. The law is not coexistent with morality, and as a result intuitions of justice are not always the subject of legal mandates.217 For example, in contract law, courts may permit the “efficient breach” of contracts in
situations in which it is expedient to fail to comply with one’s contractual
obligations and pay damages. 218 Efficient breach is permitted, despite the
fact that many people intuitively feel that breaking one’s word is wrong. 219
Even if not all intuitions about fairness have been incorporated into the
law, intuition remains a valuable tool in making legal compliance decisions.
Knowing whether something that may be viewed as reprehensible can be
legally pursued is an incredibly difficult task. The law is extensive with a
myriad of tools for punishing those who may draw public distain. Even if a
particular legal compliance decision is legally permissible, if it enrages the
public’s practical reason, i.e., collective intuitions of justice, the business
entity may still suffer in a variety of different ways, including erroneous
prosecution, nuisance litigation, increased governmental scrutiny, and the

217. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s
views on the boundary between law and morality and his belief that the two are not coexistent).
218. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory
of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975
(2005).
219. Id.
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creation of new onerous regulations. Moreover, to fixate only on the legal
permissibility of a legal compliance decision would be a mistake. Intuition
can also be an incredibly useful tool in determining the extra-legal punishments that might result from legally permissible reprehensible conduct, for
example, consumer backlash, the inability to enter into business alliances,
and the lack of available credit.
C. Intuitions Can Vary Among and Within Groups of Individuals
The previous subpart dealt with the general concern that intuition may
yield incorrect conclusions about the state of the law because intuition may
be subject to error, intuition may be deceived, and intuitions of justice may
not be incorporated into the law. The subpart left open the issue of why intuitions about the law potentially may be subject to error beyond circumstances in which deception has occurred or the particular intuition has not
been adopted into the law. The chief reason that an individual’s intuition
may erroneously predict the legal and extra-legal implications of a legal
compliance decision is that moral intuitions can vary. These variations in
moral intuition can occur for a myriad of different reasons, including genetic predisposition; the physical attributes of the brain; errors in perception;
and differences in educational background, religious background, and other
sorts of social experience. As a result, a very real concern is created regarding the accuracy and usefulness of intuition in making legal compliance decisions.
Concerns regarding errors in intuition based in large part upon variations in intuition among and within groups of individuals provide the
strongest reason for the primacy of extensive and exhaustive legal research
when making legal compliance decisions for business entities. This Article
has consistently and unwaveringly stated that legal research must be at the
heart of making any legal compliance decision. Although legal research
and the analytic reason associated with it are potentially fallible, legal research is likely to yield better predictions about the state of the law than
ethical intuitions alone because of how widely intuitions can vary.
Nonetheless, intuition remains a useful tool in making legal compliance decisions for a variety of reasons. First, certain aspects of the law are
often determined at least in part based upon intuition. Most of the legal
compliance issues facing businesses relate to the prevention of some form
of misrepresentations against the government, equity holders, creditors,
employees, or the public. 220 Whether a particular statement crosses the line
and becomes a misrepresentation is often determined based upon a mix of
intuition and the available facts. Even if intuitions may at times be inaccu-

220. See supra note 6–7 and accompanying text (arguing that most legal compliance issues for
business entities relate to the prevention of some form of fraud or misrepresentation).
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rate or vary, intuition still may be the best tool available to answer certain
legal compliance questions, especially if these questions are ultimately
handed to a jury, which is unlikely to adhere to whatever instructions it is
given and to resort to intuition itself. 221 Second, this Article is limited to a
relatively narrow range of legal issues, i.e., it focuses on the use of intuition
in legal compliance decisions for business entities. As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, human intuition tends to vary widely on many social issues, including, abortion, the use of military force, and gun control.
With that said, intuitions of justice do coalesce on certain topics, which include the notion that misrepresentations are wrong. 222 As a result, intuition
can be a valuable tool in making legal compliance decisions because less
variation is likely to exist in terms of intuitions regarding legal compliance
issues, which tend to focus on avoiding misrepresentations.223 Third, although legal research and the analytic reasoning associated with it may in
some cases yield better predictions regarding the state of the law, extralegal punishments, such as consumer backlash, the inability to form business alliances, and the inability to obtain credit, are inflicted by the masses
who tend to resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, when inflicting these
punishments. Intuition is likely the best tool for determining what sort of
extra-legal punishments will be incurred because one would have a difficult
time arguing that analytic reasoning is the best means of predicting intuition-fueled behavior that often defies reason. Fourth, despite concerns regarding intuitions varying among and within groups of individuals, intuition
may be the best and only tool available to deal with the limitations in time,
information, and resources that occur commonly in practice. The practice
of law does not occur in a controlled environment in which time for research is limitless, the facts surrounding a legal matter are crystal clear, and
the resources to find the answer to a legal solution are endless. As a result,
intuition may be a necessary evil in making legal compliance decisions for
business entities. Finally, even if intuitions do vary, they still offer an additional data source that may be useful.
V. METHODS OF EMPLOYING ETHICAL INTUITIONISM IN LEGAL
COMPLIANCE DECISIONMAKING
Despite the fact that the use of intuition in making legal compliance
decisions for business entities raises a variety of valid concerns, intuition is

221. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (noting that juries often ignore whatever instructions are given to them by judges and resort to their moral intuitions about the matter before
them).
222. See supra note 8 (providing various citations for the proposition that most people agree
that fraud is wrong).
223. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (arguing that intuition is one of the best tools for
detecting misrepresentations and fraud).
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still a valuable tool for finding the law when legal research is exhausted.
Intuition is also a useful tool for determining what sorts of legal and extralegal punishments may result from a business entity’s actions and a useful
tool for coping with the pressures created by limited information, time, and
resources. Once the value of intuition in legal compliance decisionmaking
has been acknowledged, however, the issue becomes when and how intuition can be meaningfully incorporated into the legal compliance decisionmaking process.
A. Approaches to Legal Compliance
To begin to answer these issues, one must note that intuition can only
be meaningfully incorporated into the legal compliance decisionmaking
process when a business entity is attempting to comply with the law. Approaches to legal compliance can be grouped into three broad categories: 1)
obliviousness to the law, 2) willful disregard of the law, and 3) attempted
compliance with the law.
Although arguing that obliviousness to the law is an approach to legal
compliance might seem strange, remarkably, this is the approach to legal
compliance used by many business entities, especially small business entities without legal counsel. For example, business entities commonly sell
securities without knowledge of federal and state securities laws, engage in
consumer transactions without understanding consumer protection law, and
deal with employees without knowledge of employment law. When a business entity has adopted an approach to legal compliance founded upon obliviousness to the law, intuition has very little role to play in making actual
legal compliance decisions. In the absence of any knowledge of the law,
one would have a hard time arguing that any meaningful legal compliance
decisions are being made. Some basic intuitions of right and wrong may
come into play and help to avoid some legal traps. However, in the absence
of informed choice, intuition is not really being incorporated into the legal
compliance framework, but intuition simply becomes a substitute for it. As
should already be clear, this Article in no way advocates for the replacement of a structured framework for legal compliance decisionmaking with
intuition alone.
Willful disregard of the law offers a second possible approach in regard to legal compliance issues facing a business entity. For example, if a
business entity is making a decision regarding how to dispose of toxic materials and knows what the law requires in regard to disposal of that waste, a
business entity could always consciously decide to dump that waste illegally. When the law is being willfully disregarded, intuition cannot be incorporated into the legal compliance framework because intuitions of right and
wrong are likely being ignored. In the alternative, if a business entity is acting upon aberrant, antisocial intuitions of its management, intuition is still
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not being incorporated into a legal compliance decisionmaking framework
because a conscious decision is being made to violate the law and not to attempt to comply with it. In terms of both obliviousness to the law and willful disregard of the law, the law is being disrespected. As a result, intuition
has very little role, if any, to play in making decisions regarding how to
comply with the law.
A third approach to legal compliance for business entities is attempted
compliance with the law. Only under this approach can intuition be meaningfully incorporated into the legal compliance decisionmaking process.
Unlike an approach founded upon obliviousness to the law in which intuition is at best being used as a substitute for the legal compliance decisionmaking process and unlike an approach founded upon willful disregard
of the law in which the legal compliance decisionmaking process is being
corrupted and ignored, attempted compliance with the law focuses on making real decisions about legal compliance. As a result, intuition can actually
be employed in this process.
B. Incorporating Intuition into Legal Compliance Decisionmaking
If legal compliance is being attempted, the next issue is when intuition
should come into play during the legal compliance decisionmaking process.
Consistently, this Article has emphasized the primacy of legal research.
This, however, does not mean that legal research should be the beginning of
the legal compliance decisionmaking process. As previously explained, intuition can potentially limit information gathering costs. 224 This, however,
can only occur if intuition is employed prior to undertaking exhaustive legal
research. For example, if a particular act seems intuitively repugnant, a
business entity may not want to waste the time, energy, and resources investigating if it is legally permissible because even if it is, the particular act
may yield significant social punishments that will outweigh any benefit. In
addition, resorting to intuition when first faced with a legal compliance issue can also be beneficial because it prevents the type of rationalization that
can occur when business managers desperately want a particular act to be
legally permissible. 225 For example, in the Ford Pinto case discussed
above, a great deal of rationalization likely occurred during the process of
determining whether to recall the automobiles, which likely clouded the intuitions of those individuals ultimately making the decision whether to issue

224. See supra Part III.B (explaining that intuition can assist in discovering the law).
225. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law as Rationalization: Getting Beyond Reason to Business
Ethics, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 959, 1020 (2006) (discussing the dangers of rationalization in making
legal compliance decisions in a business setting because “[w]hether in our own minds, or in a
group of like-minded executives, we are wholly capable of mistaking what makes us happy or fulfilled for what is right”).
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the recall. 226 In fact, intuition should be referenced throughout the legal
compliance decisionmaking process. Before acting, however, all intuitions
should be backed up and validated as much as possible by exhaustive legal
research.
If ubiquitous use of intuition is supposed to occur in the legal compliance decisionmaking process, the issue that remains as to how this incorporation into the process is supposed to occur. This is an exceedingly difficult
issue to address because businesses vary in size, sophistication, purpose,
and structure, and as a result, a “one size fits all” answer does not exist as to
how intuition should be incorporated into legal compliance decisions. For
example, the methods of incorporating intuition into the legal compliance
decisionmaking process of a large, multinational corporation are going to be
dramatically different than the methods of incorporating intuition into a
small limited liability company that has been formed for a very narrow purpose. Some general themes, however, can be offered, including that counsel and managers must be empowered to make decisions at least in part
based upon their intuition, that business entities should consider incorporating independent committees and outside consultants to review business decisions that may create backlash for the companies, and that focus groups
should be convened for especially important business decisions that have a
legal compliance component.
As a starting point, counsel and managers must be empowered to make
decisions at least in part based upon their intuition. Although for-profit entities must labor to make a profit,227 the ethical implications of business decisions must also be considered because they ultimately are related to the
profitability of a business. 228 If a business behaves in an unethical manner,
it risks legal penalties and extra-legal punishments. As previously explained, because most individuals make moral decisions based upon practical reason, i.e., intuition, 229 counsel and business managers must be em-

226. See supra notes 186–191 (discussing the events that led to the Ford Motor Company failing to issue a recall of its Ford Pinto automobiles).
227. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is the classic case for the proposition that a for-profit entity
must be run for purposes of making a profit. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In that case, which is
found in many business law textbooks, the Supreme Court of Michigan held, “A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” Id. at 684; see also
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1365 (1932) (“Historically, and as a matter of law, corporate managements have been required to run their affairs in the interests of their security holders.”).
228. See S. Scott Massin, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of the Past—A Proposal
for the Future, 10 Midwest L. Rev. 115, 130 (“While early business leaders focused upon profit
making, without regard to ethical behavior, contemporary society has required more. Consumer
advocacy, environmental awareness, and a better educated populous now demand that corporations become morally responsible.”).
229. See supra Part II.D (noting that most individuals approach moral issues using practical
reason, i.e., intuition).
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powered to consider their own intuition in making legal compliance decisions.
Obviously, the use of intuition by counsel and business managers will
be far from perfect. Lawyers receive extensive training that tends to make
them risk adverse, 230 and this training tends to skew their moral compasses
toward providing advice founded upon excessive risk aversion. 231 In addition, both lawyers and business managers can also find their moral compasses altered in the opposite direction because of the pressures created by
attempting to make the business that they represent as profitable as possible. 232 The danger of over rationalization is a constant concern in any business setting. This is especially true for lawyers because law schools often
train lawyers to ignore their moral intuitions. 233 Still, lawyers and business
managers should consider their intuitions whenever possible when making
legal compliance decisions, and then, those intuitions should be backed up
and validated as much as possible with thorough legal research.
In addition, business entities should consider incorporating independent committees and outside consultants to review business decisions that
may create backlash from regulators and the public. For large corporations
that regularly engage in ethically questionable behavior that may create legal scrutiny and extra-legal backlash, adding a committee to the board that
operates independently of the rest of the board is one way that a business
entity may be able to obtain a better sense of how individuals outside of the
company may perceive a legal compliance decision. A board assembling
such a committee will likely want to choose people without legal training to
get a better sense of how the public might react to particular legal compliance decisions because the company’s counsel will likely already serve as a
good proxy for how regulators and other attorneys might react to the legal
compliance decision. For small business entities, convening an independent
committee may not be possible. For such business entities, outside consultants should be retained from time to time to explore the legal implications

230. See Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 479, 500 (2009) (“Law schools teach risk aversion to a population inclined in
that direction to a degree that goes beyond student temperaments.”); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger,
On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527, 541 (1994) (noting lawyers “are
viewed—perhaps by ourselves as well as by others—as conservative, risk-averse, precedentbound, and wedded to a narrow, legalistic range of problem solving strategies”).
231. See Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth
(Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 455
(“Lawyers, by training, tend to be fairly conservative and notoriously risk adverse.”).
232. See also Joan H. Krause, Ethical Lawyering in the Gray Areas: Health Care Fraud and
Abuse, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 121, 124 (2006) (“Clients . . . naturally gravitate toward attorneys
who share their own preferences for risk or risk aversion.”).
233. See Michael Hatfield, Professionalizing Moral Deference, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 1, 5 (2009) (“The act of being professionalized as a lawyer begins with moral desensitization. We were taught to override our moral intuition in our first year of law school.”).
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of the companies’ activities. Outside ethical consultants may also be useful
to a business entity when the business entity is operating in a geographic
area that is unfamiliar to its counsel and management. Because ethical intuitions tend to be based at least in part on social norms, having someone experienced in those social norms contribute to legal compliance decisionmaking can be equally as important as having someone who is
experienced with the law of that jurisdiction. In fact, this provides another
reason why large corporations should retain local counsel when operating in
unfamiliar jurisdictions.
Finally, for especially important legal compliance decisions, business
entities should consider convening focus groups. Convening such focus
groups offers a variety of benefits. First, a focus group composed of random members of the public is unlikely to engage in the rationalizations in
which counsel and business managers may engage in the unrelenting pursuit of profit. For example, if Ford Motor Company convened a focus
group prior to making a final decision about the Pinto recall, the focus
group would have likely tried to persuade the company to issue a recall,
which would have avoided the legal and extra-legal punishments that resulted from the company’s actions. Second, the focus group would also
give a better idea of what sorts of extra-legal punishments might result from
a particular legal compliance decision. Not everything that is legally permissible is a good business decision. In addition to knowing the legal consequences of a legal compliance decision, knowing the extra-legal consequences, for example, consumer backlash, inability to enter business
alliances, and inability to obtain credit, can also be very useful in deciding
how to operate a business entity. Although convening focus groups can potentially be costly, when making especially difficult legal compliance decisions, the cost can be worth it to understand what sort of extra-legal punishments might result. Third, focus groups can also be useful in
understanding what another sort of focus group, i.e., a jury, might do in the
event that a legal compliance decision ends up in litigation. As previously
explained, juries tend to ignore jury instructions and use their intuitions of
justice in reaching verdicts. Convening a focus group can be a valuable
tool in understanding how a jury might react to a particular legal compliance decision before a decision that might lead to litigation is ever made.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article challenges the view held by many in legal education and
in practice that what lawyers should do consists solely of engaging in legal
research and analytic reasoning. 234 As discussed in Part II, this challenge is

234. In the 1973 movie adaption of John Jay Osborn Jr.’s novel The Paper Chase, Professor
Charles W. Kingsfield Jr. informs his contracts class during their first session: “You teach your-
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made with good reason, i.e., that academics from numerous disciplines have
recognized that individuals use intuition at least in the part in making moral
decisions. In addition, neuroscience is producing more and more scientific
evidence to validate the intuition-based decisionmaking models of philosophers, psychologists, and economists. Moreover, the reality is that most individuals resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, when making moral decisions. This is not to claim that law and morality are coexistent. Still,
intuition can provide insights into the foundations of law, assist in the discovery of the law, and help protect business entities because intuition can
give insight into the legal and extra-legal punishments that may be visited
upon a business entity as a result of its legal compliance decisions.235
In fact, considering one’s ethical intuitions may be as reasonable and
as useful as resorting to analytic reason. This is not to claim that legal research and analytic reasoning should play no role in making legal compliance decisions for business entities. Exhaustive legal research should be at
the heart of any legal compliance decision. Lessons from philosophy, neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral economics, however, demonstrate that a dual process approach that incorporates both intuition and analytic reason is best for considering issues relating to a business entity’s
compliance with the law.

selves the law. I train your minds. You come in here with a skull full of mush, and if you survive,
you’ll leave thinking like a lawyer.” THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973); see also
JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1970). Professor Kingsfield’s statement and his behavior throughout the remainder of The Paper Chase demonstrate his view that “thinking like a
lawyer” chiefly consists of engaging in analytic reasoning, a view that is held by many in the legal
academy and in practice today. This Article suggests that some of the things contained within
one’s “skull full of mush” may be useful in the practice of law.
235. See supra Part III (discussing the importance of the use of ethical intuition in legal compliance decisionmaking).

